Caesar in Gaul - Roman History DOCUMENTARY — Full Transcript

1:59

secure Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and Transalpine Gaul for an unprecedented 5 years. This put

2:06

Caesar in control of four veteran Legions, the VII, VIII, IX and X, all of whom had fought

2:13

with Caesar before in Hispania and were loyal to him. They had a total of roughly 22,000

2:21

Legionaries plus auxiliaries. Caesar now had the men he needed; all he needed was an excuse

2:27

for war. Fortunately for Caesar, a Celtic tribe, the

2:34

Helvetii, was planning a migration into Gaul in 58 BC. Their leader, Orgetorix, had formed

2:42

a confederation with a number of neighbouring tribes, the Tulingi, Latobrigi, Rauraci and

2:48

Boii, and they now numbered 368,000 men, women and children. Orgetorix had even convinced

2:56

them all to burn their homes in order to leave no option of failure. However, soon he was

3:03

accused of being a tyrant, was forced to commit suicide.

3:10

Command passed to Divico. Divico was determined to stick to the plan and began amassing supplies

3:17

in order to start pouring into Gaul. To do this they would have to either pass through

3:22

the land of the Roman ally Aedui, and the province of Transalpine Gaul, or take the

3:28

longer route through the mountain passes in the North.

3:32

The Romans had built up a healthy fear of migrating tribes following the Cimbrian War

3:37

in 113-101 BC and so Caesar, hearing of this, was only too willing to come to the rescue

3:45

of the Aedui. He took the only available legion in the area and force marched them up to Geneva,

3:54

destroying the bridge on the Rhone that provided access into Transalpine Gaul.

3:59

The Helvetii appealed to Caesar asking for military access through Roman lands and promising

4:05

they would not attack. Caesar played for time, pretending to consider this offer for almost

4:11

15 days. Using this time, his legion was able to construct a fortified embankment almost

4:18

5 metres high stretching 20 miles along the river bank. With the legion manning the embankment

4:24

and now in a stronger position, Caesar denied the Helvetii access and refused to allow them

4:30

to cross. Some of the Helvetii ignored this and attempted to cross nonetheless in small

4:36

boats but were prevented from doing so by the legionaries throwing javelins and shooting

4:41

arrows into them. With the southern route thus blocked, the

4:46

Helvetii decided to take the longer northern route through the mountains into Gaul. Leaving

4:51

his top lieutenant, Labienus, in command, Caesar returned to Italy to levy a further

4:57

two legions and to pull the other 3 veteran legions out of their winter quarters in Aquileia,

5:03

bringing his total to approximately 33,000 legionaries plus auxiliaries.

5:09

Despite Labienus being in a position to easily block the mountain pass, the Helvetii managed

5:15

to push into Gallic territories and began ravaging the land. The Gauls pleaded with

5:20

Caesar to intervene and chase the Helvetii out and Caesar, yet again, was only too willing

5:27

to help, marching his legions into the Gallic territories. The decision of Labienus to not

5:33

hold the Helvetii in the mountains was likely an order received from Caesar; the Celts were

5:40

now in open terrain, which better suited the Roman legions, and their pillaging of Gaul

5:45

gave Caesar an excuse to intervene. Word reached Caesar that the Helvetii were

5:55

currently attempting a crossing at the Arar River. They had been crossing in four large

6:00

groups using many rafts and boats, but due to the size of the horde and their lack of

6:06

organisation, the crossing had already taken them days and one group was still yet to cross.

6:13

Caesar took 3 of his legions and swiftly marched to the river.

6:18

Quickly forming his legions into battle formation, Caesar fell upon the Celts waiting to cross.

6:25

Caught unaware, unprepared, and encumbered by their baggage, the Helvetii did not even

6:30

have enough time to form a proper battle line. The fighting was over quickly, with the whole

6:35

stranded group being killed or fleeing into the nearby woods whilst the other three groups

6:41

could do nothing but watch helplessly from the other side of the river. The main Helvetii

6:47

force began to move on and, not wanting to lose the initiative, Caesar quickly built

6:52

a bridge across the river and moved all of his six legions across. The crossing that

6:58

had taken the Celts 20 days had taken the Romans just 1.

7:05

Caesar began tailing the Helvetii, waiting for the right time to strike. There were a

7:14

few minor cavalry skirmishes, but nothing decisive. Caesar did once manage to find a

7:22

battlefield that was advantageous and even had Labienus in position behind the enemy,

7:27

however, due to poor communication from his scouts, Caesar was forced to pull back from

7:32

the battlefield. This caused a delay in Caesar’s plan and he was being to run low on rations.

7:40

He decided to head to the nearby town of Bibracte to resupply his army before continuing the

7:46

pursuit. As he began to march off however, Divico gave chase, harassing the rear of the

7:51

Roman army. Caesar sent his cavalry and light infantry

7:56

to fight a delaying action in order to buy time to deploy his main force on a nearby

8:01

hill. The four veteran legions formed three lines at the front with the two newly levied

8:10

Legions, along with the auxiliaries, positioned further up the hill. These men were not tested

8:15

in battle and so were not expected to do any of the fighting, instead they were to guard

8:20

the baggage and were spread thin across the hill to seemingly increase the size of Caesar’s

8:27

army. The Helvetii, numbering somewhere between 60,000-90,000 warriors, had successfully fought

8:33

off the Roman cavalry and light infantry, forcing them to retreat. They now formed their

8:39

infantry into a tightly packed shield wall and advanced on the Romans.

8:46

The front two lines of legionaries opened the battle with a volley of javelins. These

8:51

hampered the Helvetii by becoming stuck in their shields, forcing them to drop them and

8:56

to break into a looser formation. With the shield wall in disarray, the Roman front lines

9:02

charged into melee. The fighting was intense and tough but the Romans’ discipline and

9:09

experience gave them the edge. Slowly, they began to get the upper hand, with the Helvetii

9:15

being forced back to a nearby mountain. However, as the Romans pressed up the mountain, a portion

9:23

of the Helvetii allies composed of Boii and Tulingi, roughly 15,000 warriors, entered

9:29

the battle. These men had been acting as a rear-guard, protecting the camp, and now they

9:35

fell on the Roman flank, threatening to encircle them.

9:42

The Helvetii, bolstered by the arrival of their allies, began pushing back with renewed

9:46

vigour. With the two front lines of legionaries already engaging the Helvetii on the mountain,

9:53

Caesar committed his final line of veterans, which had been acting as a reserve. After

9:58

hours of hard fighting, the Helvetii on the mountain were eventually broken and forced

10:04

from the battle. However, the Boii and Tulingi fell back to the camp to make a last stand.

10:11

Using their baggage wagons they formed a makeshift rampart and continued the fight, hurling missiles

10:16

down into the Roman ranks. This is where the fighting was the most difficult as the Boii

10:22

were famed warriors and fought desperately. Finally, after fighting long into the night,

10:29

the third line was able to break into the camp, ending the battle.

10:35

The battle had lasted almost 12 hours. Caesar had lost perhaps 5,000 men, whilst the Helvetii

10:43

had lost around 40,000 to 60,000. Of the 368,000 people who began the migration, only 130,000

10:52

were now left. Caesar, with no cavalry left to speak off, was not able to give chase immediately

11:02

and gave his men three days in order to recover from the battle before starting the pursuit.

11:08

The Helvetii, seeing the Romans chasing them once more, surrendered completely and were

11:13

forced to return to their homeland and made a vassal of Rome, acting as a buffer between

11:19

Roman and Germanic lands. Caesar had achieved his aim of gaining a swift

11:24

military victory and, for now, he would be able to hold off his political enemies in

11:29

Rome. Furthermore, the Romans had now shown themselves to be a powerful force in the Gallic

11:36

theatre. After his victory, Caesar rested in Bibracte for a short time before moving

11:42

on. Rumour had already reached him of a Germanic tribe that had crossed the Rhine and was terrorising

11:49

Gaul. The Suebi, led by their king Ariovistus, had

11:56

first arrived in Gaul in 63 BC as the mercenaries for Sequani and Arverni in their war against

12:03

the Aedui, a Roman ally. The 15,000 warriors that Ariovistus initially proved decisive,

12:11

helping to secure a crucial victory over the Aedui at the Battle of Magetobriga, which

12:17

forced the Aedui to become a tributary to the Sequani. In response to this, the Aedui

12:23

sent an envoy, Diviciacus, to ask Rome for help, but the Republic was still recovering

12:30

from the political shock of the Cataline Conspiracy and was distracted by an Allobroges revolt.

12:37

The governor of Transalpine Gaul was order to help Rome’s Gallic allies when possible

12:43

and in 59 BC the Senate named Ariovistus a Friend of the People of Rome to pacify him

12:50

and keep in check. Ariovistus used that time to consolidate his

12:58

position. After helping the Sequani, he demanded a third of their lands as a payment. The Sequani

13:05

gave in and Ariovistus began moving more of his people across the Rhine to settle in this

13:11

new land. By 58 BC, the as many as 120,000 Suebi had now crossed the Rhine and made their

13:20

home in Gaul. Furthermore, Ariovistus was demanding more Sequani territory in order

13:27

to settle an extra 24,000 Germans and had been taking hostages in order to keep the

13:33

Sequani and Aedui obedient. Something had to be done.

13:41

Following his victory over the Helvetii, Caesar had taken some time to rest in Bibracte. Whilst

13:47

encamped there, he was visited by a council of Gallic leaders and diplomats, led by Diviciacus.

13:54

They complimented Caesar on his victory, and implored him to intervene in the situation,

14:00

pointing out that if Germans continued his conquests, soon the Suebi would be directly

14:06

bordering Roman territory. Caesar, again, was happy to oblige.

14:12

As Ariovistus was a “Friend of Rome” however, Caesar could not immediately go to war. Instead,

14:19

Caesar’s first invited Ariovistus to meet him, which was declined. He then sent a diplomat

14:26

to Ariovistus asking him to return the Gallic hostages he had taken and to stop any hostilities.

14:34

Caesar reminded him that if he were to comply, the Romans would still consider a “Friend

14:39

of Rome” and not take any action against him. This was a good deal for Ariovistus;

14:45

he’d be allowed to keep the lands that he had already taken from the Sequani without

14:50

a fight. Instead of accepting the terms, Ariovistus

14:56

doubled down and sent a message back to Caesar saying that if the Romans could conquer where

15:02

and how they liked, so could he. At the same time, the 24,000 new Germans who had crossed

15:10

the Rhine were allowed to raze and pillage the Gallic lands as they pleased, with more

15:15

Germans preparing to cross the river to join Ariovistus.

15:21

Caesar now had his justification, as he had a legal decree from the Senate to protect

15:27

Rome’s Gallic allies, and could justify that the Suebi were threatening Rome’s borders

15:33

and Ariovistus had forfeited his status as a “Friend of Rome” by continuing to pillage

15:38

the land of Rome’s allies. Yet again, Caesar had the chance to show himself as the saviour

15:44

of Gaul. Gathering his six legions, roughly, 30,000 men, Caesar set out on the warpath.

15:53

Both Ariovistus and Caesar recognised the importance of Vesontio, the largest town in

15:59

the Sequani territories; well-fortified and well supplied it would be crucial to the war

16:05

effort. Both forces began marching to the town, however the Romans, marching day and

16:11

night, were able to get there first. Caesar rested here briefly while supplying the legions.

16:20

But as they rested, rumours began reaching the men of the strength and ferocity of the

16:26

Germans. Even some of Caesar’s officers began having their doubts and it almost seemed

16:31

as if Caesar would have a mutiny on his hands. Casear was, however, able to restore order

16:37

by insisting that he would face Ariovistus with just the his most trusted X Legion, if

16:43

none others would follow. This inspired a fanatical loyalty in the X Legion whilst the

16:49

others, motivated by shame at being thought of as cowards rallied, and the legions began

16:55

to march out to meet the Suebi. Ariovistus, impressed with the speed at which

17:02

the Roman’s had been able to move and take Vesontio, sent messages to Caesar asking for

17:07

a meeting with only some cavalry allowed as the bodyguards at the place called Vosges,

17:13

in modern day Alsace. Caesar agreed, but the meeting did not go

17:21

well, with both generals reiterating their positions. Ariovistus even went so far as

17:27

to say that if he were to kill Caesar there would be many in Rome that would be grateful,

17:32

showing that he knows what the political situation in Rome is. Negotiations broke down after

17:38

this and the cavalry on both sides had a minor skirmish before retreating back to their respective

17:45

camps. A few days later Ariovistus asked for another

17:52

meeting. Caesar, sensing a trap, sent his translators. This was just as well, as Ariovistus

18:02

promptly captured the two and even considered burning them alive. With his plan to capture

18:08

Caesar having failed, Ariovistus instead moved to battle. His army composed of 6,000 cavalry,

18:17

16,000 light infantry and the rest heavier infantry for a total of around 30,000-40,000

18:23

men. Taking Caesar by surprise, Ariovistus marched this force quickly behind Caesar’s

18:30

position and set up camp, cutting off the Romans from their supply lines.

18:37

For five days, Caesar drew out his army in battle formation willing to give battle, but

18:43

Ariovistus was content to wait and strangle Caesar’s supply line, only engaging in cavalry

18:49

skirmishes. The Suebi cavalry fought in a unique fashion, for every horsemen there was

18:56

an infantryman mixed into their formation. These men were lightly armed in order to keep

19:01

up with the cavalry and together provided a flexible and difficult force to handle and

19:07

the Roman cavalry got the worse of the fighting. Caesar, knowing that he would have to do something

19:15

to break the stalemate or else risk being starved out, formed his legions into three

19:21

lines. He marched this force past the Suebi position and ordered the third line to begin

19:27

construction of a second camp whilst the first two lines formed up to defend them. Ariovistus

19:34

sent all of his light infantry and cavalry to harass the legionaries but seemed reluctant

19:40

to commit his entire force and so they were easily held off by the Romans. With the second

19:46

camp complete, Caesar left two Legions and part of his auxiliaries to defend it, whilst

19:52

his other four legions returned to the main camp.

19:58

Realising that Caesar would now be able to use this second camp to reconnect with this

20:02

supply line, Ariovistus sent part of his army to attack this second camp. The fighting was

20:09

tough, lasting from midday into the evening but, eventually, the Romans were able to repel

20:15

the attack, and even took some prisoners. Upon questioning these Suebi, Caesar learnt

20:21

that Ariovistus had apparently been told by his priests not to commit his army until after

20:28

the new moon, which was why he had not used his whole army to prevent the legions constructing

20:33

their second camp. Having learnt this Caesar decided to go on

20:42

the offensive. Leaving a small garrison in each camp, Caesar formed his 6 legions into

20:48

a triple axis formation with his cavalry in reserve and marched on the Suebi camp. The

20:55

Germans came out to meet him, forming their wagons and baggage train in a semi-circle

20:59

behind them, their women standing on them urging the men on. Noticing that the German

21:05

left flank was slightly weaker, Caesar positioned himself opposite on the Roman right and gave

21:11

the order for his men to charge. But as he did, the Suebi also charged. Their assault

21:17

was so fast and surprising that the Romans had to drop their pila before they could even

21:22

throw them, drawing their swords and fighting in hand to hand combat. The Germans managed

21:28

to form a shield wall and neither side seemed able to gain an upper hand. Having been unable

21:35

to throw their javelins before charging, the Romans struggled to break the shield wall

21:41

as easily as they had at the Battle of Bibracte and took drastic measures attempting to wrench

21:43

away the German shields with their hands and even throwing themselves against the wall

21:44

to try and break it. After some hard fighting, the Roman right, led by Caesar, started to

21:49

push back the German left. However, the Suebi on the right outnumbered their Roman opposition

21:56

and were started to get the upper hand. The Roman cavalry, led by the son of the Triumvir

22:02

Marcus Licinius Crassus - Publius, had not yet engaged in the battle and from his position

22:08

he could see the Roman left starting to crumble. Using his own initiative, Crassus led the

22:14

third line which had been kept in reserve, to support the flank, arriving just in time

22:20

to avoid a disaster. With their left flank broken and their right now under severe pressure,

22:27

the Suebi army broke and ran. It is not known how many people died in this battle, but the

22:33

Germans, attempting to retreat through their wagons, were said to have been packed so tightly

22:39

that the dead could not even fall over. The entire Suebi force, including Ariovistus,

22:47

fled back across the Rhine, pursued by the Roman cavalry. Caesar had won two important

22:54

campaigns in one season. For now, he left Labienus to winter with the legions in the

23:00

Sequani territory whilst he attended to his governing duties in Cisalpine Gaul. But by

23:06

wintering his Legions in Gallic territory, Caesar was making a point: this was beginning

23:12

to look less like intervention and more like occupation. With the Germanic threat dealt

23:18

with Caesar would be able to turn his attention to Gaul proper.

23:29

The Belgae were a loose collection of various tribes and had fought constant wars with the

23:35

Germanic tribes across the Rhine which had fostered a strong and experienced warrior

23:40

culture. They knew of how successful Caesar had been in Gaul already and were justifiably

23:47

suspicious of his intentions. To counter the rising Roman threat, the Belgae formed a confederation

23:55

led by the king Galba of the Suessiones. Labienus sent word of this coalition to Caesar

24:07

in Cisalpine Gaul, who immediately took action. Caesar raised a further two legions and moved

24:13

straight to the Belgae border. It is worth noting that Caesar now had eight legions under

24:20

his command, approximately 44,000 men including auxiliaries, double the amount he had initially

24:26

been allocated by the Senate. Furthermore, while the Belgae raising an army could certainly

24:32

be seen as a potential threat, Caesar made no efforts to get the Cassus Bellis he had

24:38

when fighting the Helvetii and Suebi. The Republic had less and less control over Caesar,

24:44

and many in Rome were beginning to talk about these conquests not being in Rome’s best

24:49

interest, but in Caesar’s. Nevertheless, Caesar marched his legions quickly

24:57

into the territory of the nearest Belgic tribe, the Remi, who were completely taken aback

25:02

by the speed at which the Romans had been able to mobilize and surrendered instantly,

25:07

swearing to Caesar that they had never been a part of the Confederation. The Remi even

25:12

provided Caesar with all the information they had on the alliance, including which tribes

25:17

were involved, how many men each tribe was contributing and that they were currently

25:22

marching towards the Remi’s territory. With this information, Caesar convinced his

25:30

Gallic allies, the Aedui, led now by Divitiacus, to invade the lands of the Bellovaci, a powerful

25:37

Belgae tribe, to open a second front while he marched towards the Belgic alliance’s

25:43

main army. Caesar crossed a bridge over the Axona River and encamped in a strong position

25:51

on a hill on the other side. The river provided protection from the rear, and marshy land

25:57

at his front made a frontal assault difficult. Furthermore, Caesar had learned his lesson

26:04

from fighting Ariovistus and left six cohorts in a well-fortified position on the other

26:09

side of the bridge, securing his supply line. With no chance of being starved out from his

26:16

position, Caesar waited for the Belgae to make their move.

26:21

Meanwhile, the Belgae had marched to the Remi town of Bibrax, just eight miles from where

26:28

Caesar was camped, and besieged it. Caesar gives the total number of the Confederation

26:34

as 300,000. However, it is unclear how much this number is exaggerated and how many of

26:41

these men were currently in the army. A more realistic estimation would be somewhere around

26:47

80,000 men - still a force to be reckoned with, almost double that of Caesars. In the

26:54

face of such a large force, the Remi sent messages to Caesar saying that they would

26:59

be unable to hold the town without his help. Caesar, however, was reluctant to give up

27:07

his defensive position, as he thought that that the attack on Bibrax was a trap designed

27:12

to force him to do that. Instead he kept his legions in camp, but sent a substantial contingent

27:19

of auxiliaries, composed mainly of Cretan archers and Balearic slingers, to sneak into

27:25

Bibrax to help the Remi. With Bibrax thus reinforced and Caesar not taking the bait,

27:32

Galba instead marched his army to meet the Romans, encamping just two miles from the

27:37

Roman camp. Caesar was reluctant to engage Galba straight

27:43

away and instead focused on cavalry skirmishes to test the strength of the Belgae. While

27:50

this was going on, he further reinforced his position, digging long trenches and constructing

27:55

defensive towers on the flanks of his position. Realizing that attacking such a strong position

28:05

would be suicidal, Galba instead sent roughly 15,000-20,000 men to ford the river and attack

28:12

the six cohorts on the other side, hoping either to draw Caesar from the hill or to

28:18

cut off his supply line and starve him out. Seeing this, Caesar gathered all his light

28:26

infantry and cavalry and marched quickly to oppose the crossing, leaving his legions in

28:31

their defensive position. The Roman cavalry arrived just in time and fell upon the few

28:37

Belgae who had made it to the other bank, killing many and forcing them back into the

28:43

river. At the same time, the Roman missile troops peppered the Belgae still in the water

28:48

with stones, javelins, and arrows. They doggedly tried to continue their crossing despite taking

28:55

heavy casualties, but Galba had no choice but to pull his men back.

29:01

To make matters worse, word had now reached him that the Aedui were rampaging through

29:06

the Bellovaci lands. With the Romans to his front so heavily dug in and with another army

29:12

now threatening his flank, Galba decided to withdraw. The tribes would all disperse to

29:18

their respective homelands, but all agreed to reassemble if the Romans marched further

29:24

into Belgae lands. As the Confederation’s army dispersed, Caesar

29:32

cautiously pursued with his cavalry and three legions under Labienus, harassing the Belgae.

29:39

Due to their lack of coordination, the Belgae suffered heavy casualties in this retreat.

29:45

The battle had cost the Confederation approximately 10,000 men and had forced the tribes to divide,

29:52

making them easier for Caesar to conquer. Many tribes simply surrendered in the face

29:58

of the Roman Legions, including the Bellovaci and Galba’s Suessiones.

30:06

However deeper in Belgae territory, the Nervii did have time to organize and were not going

30:12

to give up so easily. They were outraged by Caesar’s foray into Belgae territory and

30:19

alongside their neighbours the Viromandui, Atrebates, and Aduatuci, were able to gather

30:25

an army of approximately 50,000 men, led by the Nervii king Bodougnatus. Caesar, hearing

30:38

that this force was gathering against him, marched for the River Sabis on the edge of

30:43

Nervi territory. Bodougnatus had learned the lesson from Galba

30:48

and knew that he could not allow the Romans the chance to fortify their position and so

30:53

he positioned his men in ambush on a hill on the other side of the river. He also had

30:59

his troops construct hedge-like obstructions, which were placed on the other side of the

31:03

river to disrupt the Roman formations and cavalry.

31:10

Caesar marched his army in two groups; his veteran six Legions who marched in the front

31:16

were the first to reach the river and began constructing a camp on a hill with the river

31:21

in front, while the two newer legions marched behind with the baggage train. Caesar sent

31:28

his cavalry and light infantry across the river, which was only 3 feet deep, in order

31:33

to scout the opposite bank. They were met by some Nervii cavalry, and a brief skirmish

31:39

broke out. However, the Belgae cavalry fell back drawing in the Romans until the entire

31:45

Nervii force broke cover and fell upon them. The Roman cavalry and light infantry broke

31:52

and ran back across the river to the Roman camp, the Nervii army in hot pursuit. Thus

31:59

started the battle of the Sabis river. The Belgae moved from the woods and across

32:06

the river so fast that the legions had almost no time to prepare. However, their experience

32:13

and discipline kicked in; rallying to the nearest cohort and legionary standards, they

32:18

were able to put together a coherent battle line. But as the legionary engineers did not

32:24

have time to clear the campsite as they usually would, the legions were divided by the hedge-like

32:29

obstructions laid down by Bodougnatus, which prevented them from forming a cohesive formation.

32:37

As a result, the legions were almost fighting 3 separate battles: the 10th and the 9th on

32:43

the left against the Atrebati, the 11th and 8th in the centre against the Viromandui and

32:49

the 12th and 7th on the right against the largest group, the Nervi with the two remaining

32:55

legions, the 13th and 14th still with the baggage train, yet to join the battle.

33:01

The fighting was brutal, with Caesar himself going from group to group, encouraging his

33:06

men. Eventually, the Roman left was able to push their enemy back enough to hurl their

33:12

javelins into their ranks and charge. They were able to force the Atrebati back across

33:18

the river, even making it into the Belgae camp. The Roman center was also finding success,

33:25

pushing the Viromandui down to the banks of the river.

33:30

However, the Roman right was having a hard time. With the center pushing forward, the

33:37

Nervii poured into the gap, almost surrounding the 12th and 7th legions and falling upon

33:43

on the auxiliaries who had retreated to the camp. The remaining auxiliaries, including

33:49

most of the Roman cavalry who had been marching in front of the baggage train, saw this and

33:54

fled, assuming the Roman right had been completely destroyed and the battle lost.

34:00

They were not without reason: the 12th had lost their standard, their chief centurion,

34:06

most of the other centurions and the Romans were beginning to break. Seeing this disaster,

34:12

Caesar knew he would have to do something or risk losing the whole campaign. Snatching

34:17

up a shield, he pushed himself to the front line of the legion, bolstering the morale

34:22

of the men. With the 7th legion under heavy pressure as well, Caesar ordered them to form

34:28

a defensive square with the 12th and hold their ground.

34:33

At this point, the battle began to swing in the Romans’ favour. Labienus, in charge

34:40

of the 10th and 9th Legions, saw what was happening from the other side of the river

34:46

and sent the 10th to relieve the Roman right, while the remaining two Legions had finally

34:51

joined the battle and were attacking the Nervii in the Roman camp. The Roman auxiliary cavalry

34:58

also returned to the battle seeing this change in fortune, and it was now the Nervii who

35:04

faced disaster. The Viromandui had fled upon seeing the Roman reinforcements, and the Nervii

35:10

were now surrounded. They fought bravely, and Caesar even commended them later, but

35:16

their defeat was now inevitable. The Belgae casualties were devastating, Caesar

35:24

saying that just 500 survived the battle. The Roman losses had also been high, with

35:30

perhaps as many as 5,000 Romans dead. Without Caesar’s personal leadership and the timely

35:37

interventions of the legions, it is likely that the battle would have been lost, Caesar

35:42

killed, and the campaign ended. But the battle was over, and Caesar was once again victorious.

35:51

The Nervii surrendered, becoming a vassal of Rome, and the Atrebati were conquered soon

35:57

after. Rome was now in control of most of Gaul.

36:04

By 56 BC Caesar had subjugated the majority of Gaul either through conquest or political

36:11

alliances and was beginning to look for new opportunities to expand Rome’s influence.

36:17

But not all the Gallic tribes were taking kindly to Roman rule; one such tribe was the

36:23

Veneti, located in modern Brittany. Despite signing a peace treaty with Caesar, the year

36:31

before, they reneged on this promise and captured a few Roman officers. As a largely sea faring

36:38

nation, the Veneti were confident that they would be able to put their faith in their

36:42

navy and force Caesar to make concessions. However, Caesar spent no time trying to negotiate,

36:50

instead seeing the act as a direct declaration of war and marched on the tribe. Initially,

36:57

he found little success; due to their large navy the Veneti were able to effectively hop

37:04

from town to town, moving entire populaces and their belongings, denying the Romans a

37:10

pitched battle or siege. Standard Roman tactics proved ineffective therefore and it was clear

37:17

that, in order to win, Caesar had to defeat the navy. With no navy on hand he ordered

37:23

that a fleet be built in order to take on the Veneti navy. But compared to the Roman

37:31

ships, which were designed for the Mediterranean, the Veneti ships, designed for the Atlantic,

37:37

were much stronger and taller and the Romans found them impossible to ram or board. It

37:43

was only through the ingenuity of one of his legates, Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus, who

37:48

suggested that they us billhooks to cut down the sails and cripple the Veneti boats that

37:54

Caesar was able to defeat their navy. With this issue sorted, it now seemed that Caesar

38:00

would be able to move on to new conquests. Once again though, his plans were put on hold

38:08

in 55 BC when yet another roaming German horde, composing of Usipetes and Tenchtheri, began

38:15

threatening the Rhine border. These tribes previously rivalled the Suebi, but were now

38:21

fleeing in huge numbers, Caesar giving their total number, including civilians, as 430,000.

38:29

They had already slaughtered the Menapii and stolen their ships in order to cross the river,

38:34

and were now pouring into Gaul. Upon hearing about this, Caesar was once again compelled

38:42

to act, as he was worried that Gauls might join the Germans in an attempt to oust the

38:47

Romans. Some Gallic tribes in the Rhine valley had indeed sent emissaries to the Germans,

38:53

providing them with food and intelligence, encouraging them to move deeper into Gaul.

39:00

Caesar gathered a council of Gallic chiefs and convinced them to provide more cavalry

39:05

for him to confront the Germans. This served two purposes, firstly, Rome’s cavalry had

39:11

always been lacking and the Gauls were renowned horsemen and so filled a crucial role in the

39:17

army, and secondly, because cavalry was composed largely of nobles or wealthy persons, they

39:23

would act as hostages ensuring good behaviour. He then gathered 5 of his legions and headed

39:30

to the Rhine. The Germans had sent a large portion of their

39:37

cavalry ahead of their main force in order to carry out raiding missions, but hearing

39:43

that Caesar was getting close, they sent emissaries in order to delay him. They asked Caesar to

39:49

negotiate, claiming that they were only in Gaul because they had been forced to flee

39:53

from the Suebi and promised to ally with Rome if Caesar could provide them with land in

39:59

Gaul. However, Caesar suspected that the Germans were delaying and continued his advance.

40:07

The envoys continued back and forth as Caesar continued to progress toward the German camp,

40:13

sending forward his 5000 cavalries as an advanced force but with orders not to provoke them

40:18

into attack. However, upon seeing the Roman cavalry separated from the main force, the

40:25

German’s fell upon them. The Romans initially tried to hold their ground but were eventually

40:30

overwhelmed and retreated to the safety of Caesar’s camp. Caesar likely underplays

40:36

the amount of casualties taken, giving the number as 74, but he does mention that two

40:42

brothers of the famous and influential Piso family had died in the fighting, something

40:47

that Caesar could not let go unpunished. Refusing to hold back any longer, Caesar gathered

40:55

his force to attack the Germans. But before he moved off the Germans sent a party of diplomats,

41:02

including high ranking nobility, to treat with Caesar, once again asking for peace and

41:08

apologising for the attack. As the Germans had already attacked apparently without provocation,

41:15

Caesar refused and took the delegates as prisoners. He then drew up his army in three lines and

41:21

moved swiftly to the German camp. The Germans, assuming that Caesar still would have been

41:28

delayed by their envoys, were caught completely unaware. The legions fell upon their camp.

41:35

Caesar brushes over the details, but it seems to have been somewhat of a massacre. The fleeing

41:41

Germans were pursued by the Roman cavalry. Some made it across the river in their boats,

41:47

but many tried to swim across and drowned. Hearing of the defeat, the German cavalry

41:52

which had been pillaging returned across the Rhine. Caesar’s army had taken minimal casualties.

42:03

It is important to note that while Caesar portrayed this as a great victory against

42:07

a marauding Germanic horde, this is not how others saw it. To Caesar’s political rivals

42:14

in Rome, Caesar had broken the armistice with the Germans by antagonising them with his

42:18

cavalry, imprisoned diplomats, which was effectively a declaration of war, and then carried out

42:24

a massacre including civilians. Caesar needed something to distract the senate

42:32

and win the minds of the people, so he decided to boost his popularity by doing what no Roman

42:38

general had ever done before; crossing the Rhine. The Germanic tribe Ubii offered its

42:45

ships hoping that the Romans would assist in their war against the Suebi. Caesar, however,

42:51

deemed this unworthy of the Roman people and instead decided to build a bridge across the

42:56

Rhine between modern Andernach and Neuwied. It was an engineering marvel; the legion’s

43:03

engineers used winches to act as pile drivers, driving stakes deep into the river and constructed

43:09

the 140 to 400 m by 7 to 9 m in just 10 days. Caesar found the lands beyond the Rhine almost

43:21

deserted. Taken aback by the Roman speed and the feat of engineering, the Germanic tribes

43:27

in the area had retreated deep into the Germanic forests where they had amassed a significant

43:33

army. However, Caesar had no desire to be caught in a prolonged campaign in foreign

43:38

territory against a notoriously dangerous enemy. He spent just 18 days on the German

43:44

side of the Rhine, burning villages and crop fields, before returning and dismantling the

43:50

bridge. The campaign was a proof, not only to the

43:56

Germans but also to Caesar’s rivals in Rome, that he could overcome anything and do as

44:01

he pleased. Caesar next ambition – Britain, was once

44:06

again a perfect propaganda target. The island was on the edge of the known world and rumoured

44:12

to be a land of monsters and vast riches. It had remained effectively untouched and

44:19

bringing it into Rome’s sphere of influence would be a significant achievement. According

44:26

to Caesar, the Britons had provided some of the Gallic tribes with the resources needed

44:31

to make war. While this was a weak casus belli, Caesar was, by now, effectively doing what

44:38

he wanted with little oversight. He began gathering intel from the Gallic merchants

44:44

and sent a small reconnaissance force to the island whilst he mustered the ships he used

44:48

against the Veneti and prepared to cross with the VII and X legions.

44:54

He set sail from modern Calais and safely made it across with the most of his army,

44:59

but his cavalry had been delayed by bad weather. The Romans saw the Britons had amassed along

45:05

the White Cliffs of Dover in huge numbers, infantry, cavalry and chariots with every

45:11

warrior painted in fierce blue war paint. Caesar moved further down the coast in order

45:17

to find a better place to land but was shadowed by the Briton cavalry and chariots who were

45:22

easily able to keep pace with the fleet. When the Romans finally found a suitable beach,

45:30

Caesar arranged his transport vessels into a long line with his warships on his flanks

45:35

and ordered his men to disembark. As the transport vessels had deep keels however, they were

45:41

still some way from the shore and the Legions were forced to wade in waist deep water to

45:47

try and reach the beach. The Briton saw their opportunity and attacked, firing missiles

45:53

into the ranks of the legionnaires as they struggled through the water, weighed down

45:57

by their armour. The Briton cavalry charged in and out of the Romans, the height advantage

46:03

of being on horseback allowing them to fight much more effectively than the Romans stuck

46:07

in the water. The legionaries were taking significant casualties and seeing this, Caesar

46:13

moved his shallower keeled warships up the flanks so that his missile troops and ballistae

46:19

could fire into the Britons sides. Still, the legions were wavering with some

46:26

men not even being willing to get off their transports. It was not until an eagle bearer

46:32

of the X Legion leaped into the water and waded towards the Britons that the Legions

46:37

rallied and re-joined the battle with earnest. The fighting was fierce and contested, Romans

46:43

gathering to their nearest standards to try and maintain some form of cohesion while Caesar

46:48

used rowing boats to ferry men from the transports to areas where the Roman front line looked

46:53

in danger. Finally, the Romans were able to push through the shallows onto the beach where

47:01

their organisation and heavy armour could come into play, at which point the Britons

47:06

broke off and retreated. Caesar, without any cavalry, had no choice but to let them escape.

47:12

We don’t know the numbers of dead on either side, but being a contested landing, it’s

47:18

likely that the Roman losses were greater. Following the battle, the Romans established

47:26

a camp on the beach and the Britons sent delegates to sue for peace, probably to assess the Roman

47:32

purpose in the area. They were on home ground and could afford to wait to see what Caesar’s

47:38

next move would be, whereas Caesar, with no supply line, would be pressured to make the

47:43

first move. Caesar accepted the peace and the Britons sent a small number of hostages,

47:49

promising more later. The cavalry that had been waylaid did try

47:56

and cross once again to meet Caesar but were caught in a storm and forced to turn back.

48:01

This same storm damaged the ships that Caesar had anchored off the beach, demoralising the

48:07

Romans who could no longer escape the island. Salvaging what materials, he could from the

48:13

most damaged ships, Caesar began repairs whilst sending one legion at a time to forage for

48:19

food whilst the others defended the camp on the beach. However, whilst one of the Legions

48:24

was out foraging, the camp watch reported seeing a dust on the horizon moving their

48:30

way. This, combined with the lack of the promised extra hostages, was enough to alert Caesar

48:35

to what was happening. He gathered two cohorts and marched quickly to the Legions location.

48:41

Whilst foraging, the Legion had been ambushed. Scattered and focused on collecting food,

48:49

the Britons had been able to kill a substantial number in the initial attack. The Legion had

48:55

managed to regain some level of discipline snatching up their weapons but they were surrounded

49:00

by the British cavalry and chariots. British charioteers were trained to throw missiles

49:06

from their chariots and then dismount to fight on foot before hopping back on the chariot

49:11

when the fighting got too hard in order to regroup. This gave them the staying power

49:16

of infantry and mobility of cavalry, a tactic Caesar admired, but was now taking a heavy

49:22

toll on the surrounded Legion. Upon Caesar’s arrival with his cohorts in formation, the

49:30

cavalry and chariots retreated; the Britons had no desire to fight heavy infantry in formation

49:35

in a pitched battle without their own infantry support and allowed the Legion to withdraw

49:40

to camp with Caesar. However, bolstered by this success, the Britons

49:47

amassed their full force of infantry, cavalry and chariots and marched on the camp. Caesar

49:53

drew out his Legions to meet them. So far, he had been fighting in difficult circumstances,

50:00

in water, in ambushes, against a highly mobile enemy, but this was an ideal situation for

50:06

the Romans were their formations and discipline could truly make a difference.

50:12

The Britons charged, but in these conditions, the Romans had the significant advantage.

50:18

Whilst the chariots and cavalry had proved highly effective against small groups of Roman

50:23

infantry, with the Legions in a cohesive lines they now had little effect. The Britons quickly

50:29

caught onto this fact and disengaged, their chariots and cavalry leaving the battlefield.

50:36

The Roman infantry was now able to surge forward and catch a portion of the Briton infantry

50:41

and routing it completely. The Britons were excellent at hit and run tactics and ambushes,

50:47

but in set piece battles, the Romans were far superior.

50:55

Once again, the Britons sent a peace delegation and Caesar, knowing that his options were

51:00

limited and that he did not have enough resources to carry out a full campaign, accepted and

51:06

then hastily withdrew from the island during the night.

51:10

However, on his way back to Gaul, 2 ships were blown off course in a storm. 300 Romans

51:17

were stranded and surrounded by a Belgae tribe, the Morini, who Caesar had only recently subjugated

51:23

and were keen for spoils and revenge. The Romans were assailed them from all sides with

51:29

missiles, hitting and running at the small group. Caesar caught wind of this and gathered

51:34

as much cavalry as he could to personally lead them to the men’s rescue managing to

51:40

ride down the Gauls and save the Romans with only minimal casualties.

51:44

Laebinus would later be sent into the Belgae territory to winter in their territory and

51:49

reinforce Roman rule in the area. Neither the invasion of Britain nor this foray

51:55

into Belgae territory were significant military achievements, however, they show why Caesar

52:01

was so loved by his men. He was brave, achieving things no Roman had ever done before, he was

52:08

calm under pressure, and, most importantly, he would lead from the front and showed that

52:14

he cared for his soldiers and was prepared to risk his life to save them.

52:21

The Briton campaign had not achieved much for the Romans, but it did provide Caesar

52:26

with crucial knowledge about the Britons military, the climate, and the level of preparation

52:31

that he would need to succeed, lessons he would learn from for next year. Moreover,

52:37

the Roman public and senate were amazed by his feat of crossing the Channel into unknown

52:42

territories and a full 20 days of thanksgiving were declared to recognise his achievement.

52:51

After dealing with some administrative matters in 54 BC, Caesar began planning a second campaign

52:57

in Britain. Almost 600 hundred transports and 28 warships were built, implementing Veneti

53:04

shipbuilding techniques better suited to the rough seas. Caesar called on his Gallic allies

53:10

and vassals and amassed 4000 cavalry, including tribal leaders, once again bolstering his

53:16

army and minimising the risk of revolts in Gaul. He left half of this cavalry and 3 legions

53:22

in Gaul, and crossed with 5 legions and 2000 cavalry - more than double his previous numbers.

53:30

This was going to be a full invasion. Caesar landed at the same place as before,

53:36

but this time he was unopposed. He quickly established a camp in the area and sent out

53:42

scouts, who promptly brought back some local prisoners. They informed Caesar that a large

53:47

army had actually gathered to oppose the landing but had retreated upon seeing the size of

53:53

Caesar’s force. Leaving a legion at the camp, he immediately set out in search of

53:59

the Briton army. The Romans marched through the night and were

54:05

able to catch up to the Britons in a hillfort on the other side of a river. Although the

54:10

Romans were tired, Caesar was determined to confront them, and began crossing. The Britons’

54:17

cavalry and chariots rushed down from the high ground to harass the Romans as they crossed.

54:22

Caesar’s allied Gallic cavalry were experienced in fighting in such scenarios, and proved

54:28

their value, chasing off the Britons, who quickly retreated to the woods surrounding

54:32

the fort. As the Legions began their advance up the

54:38

hill, they were harassed from the woods by the Britons, preventing them from making significant

54:43

progress until the 12th Legion formed a testudo and were able to make a rudimentary rampart

54:49

in order to move over the walls. The Romans were now inside the fortifications, but the

54:55

Britons were quick to escape the fort and retreated deeper into the woods. Considering

55:01

the men had carried out a night march and battle, and that he did not know the terrain

55:06

and whether any more Britons would be waiting for him, Caesar made camp for the night.

55:14

The next day word reached him that a storm in the night had, again, damaged his ships.

55:20

Without the ships, Caesar would be at the mercy of the Britons, so he decided to prioritise

55:25

overseeing their repairs. He commanded his army to reassemble and march back to the beach.

55:32

Upon arriving, he discovered that 40 ships were beyond repair, but the rest were salvageable.

55:39

Caesar ordered that the ships be brought onto the beach and a large wall was constructed

55:43

encompassing the camp and the ships. He also sent word to Labienus to build more ships

55:49

in Gaul. He then set off once again to find the Britons.

55:57

They were in the same hill fort, but it was a larger force than before, under the command

56:01

of Cassivellaunus, a tribal leader beyond the Thames, who was appointed the leader of

56:06

a united coalition against the Romans. Caesar had marched past this fort, possibly

56:15

not wanting to attack such a large and fortified army, instead attacking exposed villages to

56:21

try and draw Cassivellaunus out. At the same time, his troops were constantly harassed

56:27

by the Britons’ cavalry and chariots fighting skirmishes with the Roman cavalry on the flanks,

56:32

luring them into the forests before turning back to inflict significant casualties.

56:40

The Britons seemingly allowed the Roman advanced party time to begin making a fort for the

56:45

night. However, as construction began the Britons attacked again. The Romans who were

56:51

on guard were able to form a line to defend the site, but the fighting was brutal, with

56:56

the Briton chariots darting in and out of the Roman formation. Caesar was forced to

57:01

send a further 2 cohorts from the vanguard to quickly reinforce this line.

57:09

The Romans were not used to the Briton style of fighting, particularly chariot hit and

57:14

run tactics drawing out the Roman infantry from formation who were too slow to catch

57:19

them. At one point, the Britons were able to draw out a maniple far enough to create

57:24

a gap which they were able to exploit, punching through the Roman line and inflicting many

57:29

casualties. It was not until the rest of the Roman army caught up that the Britons disengaged

57:35

and retreated. Cassivellaunus was proving himself a cunning enemy.

57:46

Caesar marched to the Thames, towards Cassivellaunus’ own territories, in an attempt to draw them

57:52

out. Though he was able to find a position on the river where could cross, the Legions

57:57

were once again harassed by Britons amassed on the other bank, who quickly retreated once

58:02

the Romans were on dry land. Cassivellaunus then made the decision to dismiss

58:10

the vast majority of his army except for 4000 chariots, likely realising that fighting a

58:17

pitched battle against the Roman heavy infantry would be futile. A smaller force would serve

58:23

him much better in a guerrilla war; it would be easier to hide, faster to move, and need

58:29

fewer supplies to maintain. Given the fact that he knew the terrain and Caesar did not,

58:35

this was a smart and calculated move. However, Cassivellaunus’ previous wars with

58:43

other Britons had made him many enemies, and his new guerrilla tactics were not popular

58:48

with the Trinobantes, whose leader Cassivellaunus had previously killed. They sent envoys to

58:55

Caesar, surrendering and promising hostages. The Trinobantes were second in power only

59:01

to Cassivellaunus himself and without their support, numerous tribes followed suit, surrendering

59:07

to Caesar. They also provided crucial intel to Caesar, including the location of Cassivellaunus’

59:15

capital. Caesar marched there, another hillfort, burning

59:20

all villages and fields on the way, and besieged it from both sides, once again hoping to draw

59:26

the Briton leader into a direct confrontation. Cassivellaunus, however, did not take the

59:32

bait. Although his guerrilla tactics were effective, they were taking a toll on the

59:38

Britons and the defenders within in the capital quickly fled.

59:43

Cassievalanus realised he needed to gain a victory. Not wanting to fight Caesar directly

59:49

though, he instead sent envoys to four allied kings in Kent, who launched an attack on the

59:55

Roman camp on the beach in order to try and draw Caesar away from Cassivellaunus’ land.

1:00:01

However, the Roman fortifications were strong, and the force Caesar had left on the beach

1:00:07

was easily able to repel the attack. Cassievalanus was forced to sue for peace.

1:00:18

Caesar readily accepted in exchange for hostages and tribute. Winter was closing in, and he

1:00:24

had no desire to spend it in unknown, hostile lands. The Romans returned to the beach and

1:00:30

sailed back to Gaul. Overall, it is hard to see the invasion as

1:00:37

an immense military victory. Cassivellaunus had not been decisively defeated in battle

1:00:43

nor captured, and the Romans maintained no presence in Britain. From the Britons’ stand

1:00:49

point it was a strategic victory, having successfully pushed the Romans out of their lands.

1:00:56

Still, his campaigns in Britain had taken 2 years, and without Caesars presence, Gaul

1:01:04

was beginning to stir. In 54 BC a Gallic tribe, the Eburones, under their leader, Ambiorix,

1:01:12

successfully revolted in Belgica, ambushing and destroying the 7000-9000 strong Roman

1:01:18

detachment that had been sent to winter in their territory at Atuatuca.

1:01:26

Following this success, Ambiorix began to besiege the Roman garrison in the Nervii territory,

1:01:32

and a general revolt in the area broke out, with Indutiomarus and the Treveri also rising

1:01:38

in rebellion and being supported by the Germanic tribes across the Rhine. This was a dangerous

1:01:45

position: Caesar had spread his legions across Gaul in order to not put too much strain on

1:01:50

the resources of one area, and thus divided, they were vulnerable targets.

1:01:57

However, he reacted quickly, marching directly to the besieged legion in Nervii territory,

1:02:04

while Labienus fought off Indutiomarus. Upon seeing Caesar approaching, Ambiorix gave up

1:02:11

the siege to face this new threat, and was quickly defeated while, almost simultaneously,

1:02:17

Labienus was able to successfully repel his opponents.

1:02:21

Roman retribution for this revolt was swift and devastating. The Eburones were effectively

1:02:27

wiped out, while Ambiorix, according to some sources, left Gaul for Germania. To help stabilise

1:02:35

the situation, Pompey mobilised two more Legions and Caesar himself raised another. He now

1:02:41

had almost 50,000 men in Gaul under his command. However, this was only the prelude to something

1:02:48

much bigger. In 52 BC Caesar returned to Italy in order

1:02:55

to defuse another political problem and in the same year, another large-scale revolt

1:03:01

started. An Arverni leader, Vercingetorix, who probably knew about the political problems

1:03:07

in Rome, had organised an alliance of powerful Gallic tribes that, inspired by Ambiorix,

1:03:14

were now seeking independence, and had begun attacking Roman outposts and Roman allies

1:03:20

in Gaul. Upon hearing this, Caesar quickly returned

1:03:26

to Gaul to handle the situation. Going on one of his famous forced marches, he swiftly

1:03:32

quelled the Senones and Carnutes by taking their capitals. His next target was one of

1:03:38

the largest towns of the Bituriges - Noviodunum. Vercingetorix attempted to stop Caesar’s

1:03:44

advance near the city, but the Roman heavy infantry was too much for the Gauls and they

1:03:49

were forced to retreat losing many, which allowed Caesar to take the city. To finish

1:03:55

off the Bituriges he needed to take their capital Avaricum. At this point, Vercingetorix

1:04:02

started employing the scorched earth tactics and Bituriges joined him by burning down 20

1:04:07

of their towns – every one but Avaricum. The Romans moved against this settlement and

1:04:13

besieged it and although Avaricum was very defensible and Vercingetorix attempted to

1:04:18

help its defenders, it fell in less than a month. Caesar slaughtered 40 thousand locals

1:04:25

and replenished his supplies. It was clear for Vercingetorix that he can’t

1:04:32

the Romans in the field. Meanwhile, Caesar was eager to end the rebellion before it spreads

1:04:38

to other Gallic tribes, so he decided to strike the decisive blow by taking the capital of

1:04:44

the Arverni - Gergovia. Leaving some troops in the area, Caesar marched with 25,000 towards

1:04:51

this settlement, while Vercingetorix shadowed him.

1:04:53

Vercingetorix shadowed him with a similarly sized force. Gergovia was in a very solid

1:04:59

defensive position, located on top of a high plateau, and Vercingetorix managed to overtake

1:05:05

Caesar and positioned his army on the hills in front of the city.

1:05:12

As he had done in previous battles, Caesar hoped to cut his enemies’ supply lines in

1:05:16

order to force them out of their defensive position, whilst he would be receiving supplies

1:05:21

from the Aedui, his Gallic allies. However, the Gauls had occupied a hill overlooking

1:05:27

the supply line, from where they could ensure water and grain could be transported into

1:05:32

the city; taking it would therefore be crucial to Caesar’s plan.

1:05:39

In a quick night attack, he was able to dislodge the Gallic garrison there and station two

1:05:45

legions on the hill, linking this position with the main roman camp by a trench. So far,

1:05:51

all was going according to plan; Caesar’s allies would supply him from the rear and

1:05:56

Vercingetorix would now be forced to either sacrifice his defensive position in order

1:06:01

to re-establish his supply line, or be starved out.

1:06:06

However, Vercingetorix had his own plans. He bribed the Aedui, who then also joined

1:06:13

the revolt, attacking the Roman supplies and threatening to cut off Caesar and surround

1:06:19

him. Once again, Vercingetorix seemed to have studied Rome’s tactics deeply, as this strategy

1:06:26

was one of Caesar’s own favourite strategies. Caesar was forced to leave two legions to

1:06:33

guard the Roman position at Gergovia, and took the other four to deal with the Aedui,

1:06:39

quickly subduing them and forcing them to send 10,000 cavalry back to the siege with

1:06:45

him. This revolt had Caesar worried that he might face even more revolts, and could soon

1:06:51

be encircled by the rebels; he needed to extract his legions from Gergovia and consolidate

1:06:57

his troops. However, the situation at the city was not

1:07:03

looking good. The two legions left to guard the Roman camp had been hard pressed the entire

1:07:09

time Caesar had been gone. Furthermore, Vercingetorix had divided his forces, leaving half to defend

1:07:17

and fortify main Gallic camp in front of the city, and half, led by himself, to fortify

1:07:23

positions on the surrounding hills on the Gallic right flank. With a 6-foot wall now

1:07:29

in front of the main Gallic camp, and the Gallic fortifications on the hills, Vercingetorix

1:07:35

had removed any opportunity for Caesar to encircle him and the city.

1:07:43

Seeing the Gallic forces divided, Caesar saw an opportunity to attack their main camp in

1:07:48

order to deal a heavy enough blow to allow his army to retreat unmolested. He sent a

1:07:54

diversionary force of one legion and some cavalry to the surrounding hills, making a

1:07:59

huge amount of noise in order to distract the force commanded by Vercingetorix. Then

1:08:05

he quickly and quietly moved his remaining legions up to the Gallic camp, leaving a few

1:08:10

cohorts in the smaller camp on the occupied hill, while the Aedui cavalry were sent to

1:08:15

flank around the Gallic left by another route. The Romans quickly clambered over the wall

1:08:23

and fell upon the Gallic camp. The Romans initially had significant success, pushing

1:08:28

the Gauls right up to the walls of the city, but Caesar ordered a withdrawal before the

1:08:33

rest of the Gallic force under Vercingetorix could reinforce them. However, only one legion,

1:08:40

the 10th, heard this order and retreated, the others continuing to press on and assaulting

1:08:46

the city itself. Some Romans managed to climb on top of the city walls but were quickly

1:08:52

cut down and thrown back off. Missiles from the city walls fell into the Roman ranks as

1:08:57

they fought around the base of the walls. Vercingetorix, realising what was happening

1:09:05

from his position on the surrounding hills, sent the rest of his force, headed by his

1:09:10

cavalry, to reinforce the camp. The Roman position was now truly desperate; the initial

1:09:16

Gallic force and the city walls were in front of them; there was no way of cutting a way

1:09:21

out by pushing forward, and with Vercingetorix crashing into their flank, the legionaries

1:09:27

were under serious pressure and were almost surrounded.

1:09:33

The officers did their best to maintain Roman discipline and form a defensive formation.

1:09:39

According to Caesar himself, 46 centurions died in this struggle, roughly a quarter of

1:09:45

all the centurions present, and so maintaining any solid formation was almost impossible.

1:09:51

The Aedui finally appeared on a hill to the Roman right flank, but the Romans, unable

1:09:57

to tell if they were allied or not, broke completely, thinking that they were about

1:10:01

to be fully surrounded. Caesar was able to use the 10th legion and

1:10:08

the cohorts that had been stationed in the small camp to cover the retreat, and prevented

1:10:14

the Gauls from chasing them down, avoiding the total destruction of his army, and withdrew

1:10:19

from the field. In his commentaries, Caesar says that only 700 men were lost in this battle,

1:10:26

but this is likely vastly underplaying the situation. Caesar being forced to assemble

1:10:31

a rear guard and retreating show how disastrous the battle was, and it is likely that the

1:10:37

Romans lost thousands, modern estimates suggesting as many as 6,000.

1:10:43

hile Caesar was fighting a losing battle against Vercingetorix at Gergovia, his best legate

1:10:50

Titus Labienus was sent to deal with rebellions in northern Gaul. Local Gauls emboldened by

1:10:57

Vercingetorix and led by Camulogenus were consolidating around modern Paris, which was

1:11:03

called Lutetia at that time and was the capital of the Parisii. Labienus has left a legion

1:11:10

near Agedincum in order to have a supply line to Caesar and marched with 4 more legions

1:11:15

towards Lutetia. His troops took Metlosedum along the way, but the attempts to cross the

1:11:21

river Seine were blocked by Camulogenus. Labienus was forced to retreat back to Metlosedum.

1:11:28

Luckily for him, his scouts have found another crossing near Metlosedum and he crossed here

1:11:36

and moved against the Gauls. However, Camulogenus used Vercingetorix’ scorched earth tactic,

1:11:43

burning Lutetia and retreating to the swamps beyond. At the same time, Labienus learned

1:11:49

about Caesar’s defeat at Gergovia, which provoked a big Gallic tribe called Bellovaci

1:11:54

led by Correus to rebel, so he knew that he had to retreat beyond Seine and unite with

1:12:00

his legion in Agedincum. Labienus’s decision to divide his forces into three provoked Camulogenus

1:12:08

into attacking him to the south of Lutetia without waiting for the Bellovaci and in the

1:12:13

ensuing battle the Romans used the fact that their divided forces were closer to each other

1:12:18

– each group supported the other and the legions managed to defeat the Gauls with ease.

1:12:24

Camulogenus was killed in the process, which slowed down the consolidation of the anti-Roman

1:12:30

rebellion in northern Gaul. Caesar and Labienus both retreated towards

1:12:36

Agedincum, where they united their forces. Meanwhile, more and more Gauls were joining

1:12:42

the rebellion and after the rest of the Aedui joined it, even the Roman province of Narbonensis

1:12:47

were attacked by them. Caesar and his 10 legions moved through the Sequani and Lingones territory

1:12:53

to the east in order to gain a line of retreat to the Roman province of Gallia Transalpina.

1:13:00

At the same time, Caesar’s envoys secured a group of Germanic mercenaries, who joined

1:13:05

the Roman cavalry. Vercingetorix and his 80 thousand tried to attack Caesar, when the

1:13:11

latter was trying to cross the Vingeanne river, but the Romans were able to stop the attack

1:13:15

with ease. It is not clear why, but this minor defeat either disheartened Vercingetorix or

1:13:22

showed him that he couldn’t win against the Romans in an open battle, so he probably

1:13:26

tried to recreate the factors that led to the victory at Gergovia, when retreated to

1:13:31

the Mandubii capital of Alesia. Caesar followed him to the settlement.

1:13:38

Alesia was a well defended city on a hill, and sent messages to his nearby allies to

1:13:47

come to his aid. Vercingetorix was in a strong position; he outnumbered Caesar, commanding

1:13:53

a force of up to 80,000 men, and was surrounded by allies who would be able to quickly send

1:13:59

men to reinforce him. From his position, it should be a simple rerun of Gergovia: he would

1:14:05

wait on the high ground for his allies to arrive so they could either disrupt the Roman

1:14:09

supply lines, or attack them from the rear. Caesar had learnt his lesson though. Despite

1:14:17

his smaller numbers, he immediately began the work of fully surrounding and besieging

1:14:22

Alesia, something which Vercingetorix had been able to prevent him doing at Gergovia.

1:14:26

The Romans began constructing a 16km wall fully encircling the entire city, complete

1:14:33

with palisades, trenches and towers, hoping to cut off any escape.

1:14:39

Vercingetorix sent his cavalry out to try and disrupt these works, but the Legions were

1:14:45

able to form a defensive line to hold them, while the German auxiliaries flanked around

1:14:50

the side. The Germans proved to be vital to the Roman cause, and their superior horsemanship

1:14:56

forced the Gallic cavalry to retreat back into the city, killing many as they were funnelled

1:15:01

into the narrow gates. Realising that he would soon be completely

1:15:08

surrounded, Vercingetorix decided to send out what was left of his cavalry at night

1:15:13

to sneak past the Roman line and to head to the nearby tribes to request reinforcements

1:15:18

as soon as possible. Upon completing the first wall, Caesar learned

1:15:25

from some Gallic deserters that these messengers had been sent, and so constructed a second

1:15:31

wall, this one almost 21km long and complete with 2 trenches and a moat, facing outwards

1:15:38

to protect against any Gallic reinforcements, creating a donut like structure with Alesia

1:15:43

in the centre. He next sent out huge foraging parties to

1:15:49

collect enough food to sustain his troops for the next 30 days. In doing this, Caesar

1:15:55

had effectively robbed Vercingetorix of his advantages; with the Romans thus defended

1:16:00

and supplied, it was the Gauls who now faced a well dug in enemy, and it was now Vercingetorix

1:16:06

whose time was running out. With an army of 80,000 men inside the city, plus the civilian

1:16:12

population and no way of resupplying, it was only a matter of time before he was starved

1:16:17

out. This was Caesar’s magnum opus. Faced with a desperate situation, Vercingetorix

1:16:26

made the difficult decision to expel anyone who wasn't going to be fighting, the old,

1:16:31

the sick, women and children. He had hoped that Caesar would allow these people through

1:16:37

the Roman defences and to safety. But Caesar was not in a merciful mood. He refused to

1:16:44

let them pass and the civilians were left between the walls of Alesia and the Romans,

1:16:49

imploring both sides for food and water, neither side relenting. Over the next few days, many

1:16:56

died of starvation and thirst, the space between the armies becoming full of the dying and

1:17:01

dead. The Gallic allies finally arrived to try and

1:17:07

relieve the siege, under the command of Veringetorix’s cousin, Vercassivellaunus. It is hard to say

1:17:14

precisely how many there were: Caesar claims that the number was as high as 250,000, with

1:17:20

modern estimates suggesting somewhere between 70,000 to 100,000. Whatever the true number

1:17:26

was, all agree that the Romans were now significantly outnumbered; at least two to one.

1:17:34

On the first day of their arrival, they quickly filled in the first Roman trench and sent

1:17:39

across a combined force of light infantry and cavalry to probe the defences, whilst

1:17:44

the rest of the army set up camp. Caesar countered by sending out his own Germanic cavalry, and

1:17:50

a fierce skirmish ensued. From their elevated position inside the city,

1:17:57

the besieged Gauls saw that their allies had arrived and simultaneously began massing for

1:18:02

a sally against the inner fortifications. However, the Germans once again proved their

1:18:08

skill, outmanoeuvring and flanking their Gallic counterparts, forcing them back across the

1:18:13

trench and into the Gallic camp. Seeing his allies defeated, Vercingetorix decided to

1:18:18

bide his time and held off his attack. The reinforcements spent the next day constructing

1:18:26

siege ladders, and then, at midnight, launched another attack. Taking the Romans by surprise,

1:18:32

they found some initial success, but Marc Anthony, in his first battle, was commanding

1:18:38

this section of the wall and proved himself to be a composed and skillful lieutenant,

1:18:43

pulling troops from other sections of the walls to reinforce his position. Again, Vercingetorix

1:18:48

began to sally out to try and help his allies, but was delayed by having to fill the Roman

1:18:53

trench. By the time he had crossed it, Anthony had successfully fought off the assault and

1:18:59

Vercingetorix again withdrew into the city. Following these two failed assaults, Vercassivellaunus

1:19:07

conducted more thorough reconnaissance of the Roman position, and discovered that a

1:19:12

steep hill overlooked the Roman wall in the northern section. Hoping to use this high

1:19:17

ground to his advantage, the next day the Gauls used their overwhelming numbers to attack

1:19:22

the entire length of the outside wall but concentrated a large force under Vercassivellaunus

1:19:27

on this portion. At the same time, Vercingetorix again sallied

1:19:34

out, this time attacking the length of the interior Roman fortifications, hitting wherever

1:19:39

looked weakest. This was the toughest the fighting had been so far. Caesar, as he had

1:19:45

done at the battle of the Sabis, dashed from cohort to cohort, urging his men on, leading

1:19:51

reserve cohorts personally to points where the defences looked like they were faltering.

1:19:56

Vercassivellaunus began making headway, pilling earthworks up against the walls in order to

1:20:02

mount them, and using hooks and siege engines to tear down the Roman defences. Caesar committed

1:20:09

every man he had left of his reserves, pulling every man who could be spared and sending

1:20:13

them into the action. It was a desperate battle for the Romans; between the two walls there

1:20:19

would be no escape, and if the line faltered the entire army would surely be wiped out.

1:20:27

The Roman line was holding the Gallic army, but it seemed like it wouldn’t last for

1:20:32

long. But then Caesar appeared at the top of the hill; leading the Germanic auxiliaries

1:20:38

he crashed into the rear of the Gallic reinforcements. Surrounded now on all sides, the Gauls who

1:20:43

had pushed through the breach were decimated and the tide of the battle changed. Seeing

1:20:49

their largest contingent broken, the moral of the rest of the Gallic reinforcements shattered

1:20:54

and they quickly fled. With this threat thus neutralised, the Romans turned to deal with

1:21:00

Vercingetorix, who was attacking the interior wall, and they were able to force him back

1:21:04

into the city. With the city still besieged and with his

1:21:10

reinforcements spent, Vercingetorix surrendered. It is unknown how many Romans died, but the

1:21:17

casualties must have been fairly significant given the intensity of the fighting, particularly

1:21:22

at the point where the fortifications had been breached. The Gallic relief force suffered

1:21:27

heavy casualties, the entirety of the besieged army in Alesia was either killed or enslaved,

1:21:33

and both Vercassivellaunus and Vercingetorix were taken alive. The Romans had lost around

1:21:39

13 thousand in this battle.

1:21:42

Although most the rebel leaders were either dead or captured, the resistance against Rome

1:21:47

was far from over, as Bituriges, Carnutes, Bellovaci, Atrebates, Andecavi and others

1:21:54

were still in open rebellion. In January of 51 BC, Caesar moved against Bituriges. This

1:22:01

winter campaign surprised Bituriges, who were probably unprepared for it, and soon they

1:22:07

sued for peace, which allowed Caesar to return to his winter quarters.

1:22:11

However, soon, the Bituriges were attacked by the Carnutes for yielding to the Romans.

1:22:19

Once again Caesar marched swiftly and took his enemies by surprise, forcing the Carnutes

1:22:24

to submit. The Romans made a new winter quarters at the capital of Bituriges Cenabum and stayed

1:22:29

there until the Spring. Leaving 6 legions in the area, Caesar took

1:22:36

4 and moved against the Bellovaci of Correus and the Atrebates of Commius. This campaign

1:22:42

proved difficult, as both tribes abandoned their lands and fought a guerilla war against

1:22:48

the Romans. Fortunately for the legions, Correus was killed in one of the ambushes, which proved

1:22:54

to be the final straw for the Bellovaci and they were convinced to seek peace, while Commius

1:22:59

retreated to the east to continue his resistance. To the south the Andecavi attacked Lemonum

1:23:08

and were defeated by Caesar’s lieutenants. Remainder of the Gallic forces in the area

1:23:13

attempted to defend at Uxellodunum, but were defeated by Caesar soon after. The last engagement

1:23:20

of the war saw Commius defeated in the north and the rebellion was over.

1:23:27

Gaul was pacified and Caesar won over the remaining Gallic leaders with gifts and the

1:23:32

promise of the lower tribute. He knew that the battle for Rome is about to start. The

1:23:38

Civil War that would end the centuries long republic was just around the corner.

1:23:43

Thus, ends the first season of our series on Gaius Julius Caesar, but he will be back

1:23:49

for the second season, so make sure you are subscribed to our channel and pressed the

1:23:54

bell button. We would like to express our gratitude to our Patreon supporters and channel

1:23:58

members, who make the creation of our videos possible. Now, you can also support us by

1:24:03

buying our merchandise via the link in the description. This is the Kings and Generals

1:24:08

channel, and we will catch you on the next one.

Caesar in Gaul - Roman History DOCUMENTARY

More from Kings and Generals

Trending Transcripts