Shadow Defense Minister James Patterson
said today the government should be much
more blunt about the military threats
facing Australia and that if we really
knew how serious those threats were, we
would be demonstrating in the streets
for more spending on our defense. Orca
submarines are part of that debate
following reports from the UK of delays,
potential delays in production. James
Patterson joins me now. James Patterson,
welcome.
>> Thank you for having me.
>> First of all, is One Nation going to run
over the Liberal candidate in Farah? The
farab election is going to be very
challenging for the liberal and national
parties. We know we are not at an
electoral high point nationally and we
know that One Nation's appeal at the
moment appears to be especially
concentrated in regional and rural
electorates. But we have an outstanding
Liberal candidate, an outstanding
national candidate. And if people do
want to see change in this country, the
best way to do that is to vote for a
Liberal or national who can actually
change the government, not a party of
protest that can't deliver anything for
an electorate like Farah or indeed the
country. Let's talk James Patterson
about your speech that you gave today.
It's essentially, as I said before,
about truthtelling in defense. As I
referenced there, you say if the if the
Australian public knew how likely
conflict is in our region and how
illprepared we were for it, they would
be marching demanding higher defense
spending. So, first of all, how likely
is it this conflict?
I also said it was important not to be
inflammatory or irresponsible and so I
don't want to do anything which alarms
Australians and I particularly don't
want to do anything that singles out any
diaspora communities or fakes makes them
feel uncomfortable. So I want to be
measured but also direct. There's not a
percentage that I can put on the
likelihood of conflict except that it is
higher than probably most Australians
think. Uh we have the context here. The
People's Republic of China is engaged in
the largest peacetime buildup of
military capability since World War II.
And accompanied with that buildup of
capability is menacing military drills
around Taiwan and rhetoric from Xi
Jinping and other Communist Party
leaders which say reunification with
Taiwan is a core objective of the
Communist Party and they are willing to
use force if necessary. Now, I don't
believe that Xiinping has made a
decision to use force, but it is our
national interest to discourage and
deter him from doing that along with
like-minded partners.
>> If cander is what you're looking for,
then shouldn't you tell us given those
circumstances, the context that you
describe, exactly what the coalition
would spend to defend Australia
particularly and on what capabilities?
Mhm. [snorts] I should provide as much
information as I can responsibly from
opposition, but I also shouldn't be
cavalier about making commitments
without expert advice. So, what I've
said is that the best informed
Australians like Sarangis Houston and
Professor Peter Dean, two of the
reviewers for the Albanesei government's
defense strategic review, have both
since said we need to be spending 3% of
GDP on defense. And the coalition is
committed to achieving that. The Albani
government has now shifted the
goalposts. They're now using a different
measure which includes things like
military pensions which we never used
before. But that accounting trick isn't
a real increase in investment in defense
capability which is what we need. So we
say we need 3% of GDP in real terms not
in pretend accounting.
>> There's been a shift in the terms used
by the US military about China. Um well
maybe it's a a shift rather in the
analysis over over over recent years.
This is this is how the uh commander of
US Indo Indo the IndoPacific Command put
it recently to the US Senate. China has
ambitions toward a global military that
will project power beyond its near
geography to set the rules for every
relationship across the globe. Is that
what you see?
>> I think it's very hard to disagree with
that analysis. Obviously, the Chinese
government's primary national security
interest is its own homeland, and it's
near abroad, including Taiwan. But it
also clearly is building a military
which is capable of projecting power far
beyond that. By tonnage and the number
of ships, it now has the largest navy in
the world. And I think history tells us
that it's very rare for great powers to
acquire such significant military
capability and then never use it. Now, I
hope that they don't use it. And we can
help make sure that happens by working
with other like-minded partners, Japan,
the United States, the Philippines, and
others who have a shared interest in the
stability and peace of the Indopacific.
But we need to be doing more than we are
now if that is what we want.
>> How much is current US behavior
impacting public support for the
alliance right now?
I think it's inarguable that an
unconventionable US administration in
the second Trump administration has
reduced Australian public support uh for
the alliance as expressed in opinion
polls and that's consistent across the
western world. It's particularly evident
in Europe. I don't think that actually
changes the fundamentals of the US
Australia alliance. It's still
incredibly robust at other levels. But I
think we should be adult and be honest
and acknowledge that that has had an
impact on how Australians view the
United States. and I hear them and
understand why they have that concern.
It doesn't mean though that Australia's
national interest has changed even if
Australians disapprove of this
administration.
>> I understand that. But is it realistic
at the same time to tell Australians
that the alliance is essentially
unchanged when what you're saying is
there is less trust in its
commanderin-chief?
>> Well, I think the alliance is about more
than just the personalities of any one
commander-in-chief. But it's also
about that.
>> Yes. And I acknowledge that and I'm not
trying to argue with you on that Sarah.
Of course, that's a relevant
consideration. But the US system is a
deep system. It includes its defense
establishment, its intelligence
establishment, its Congress. It's a
co-equal branch of government. And in
each of those branches of the
government, support for the Australia
alliance is fundamental because frankly
it's in America's national interest.
What Australia offers the United States,
it cannot get from elsewhere. things
like HMA Sterling which is the submarine
rotational base that will be established
in the next couple of years for US
nuclear submarines to visit. Things like
Pine Gap and other intelligence
facilities which are a critical part of
the Five Eyes Alliance. Those are things
which the United States gets from
Australia which it can't get elsewhere.
And in turn there are things that we get
and continue to seek from the United
States which we can't get from elsewhere
including the Orcus partnership.
>> Let let's talk about um HMA Sterling the
military base in WA. The same Admiral
Paparro said about it recently. In fact,
in the same testimony, he said, uh, it's
on track for the US forces that will
arrive there in WA next year. He said,
"We could be ready to operate a
rotational submarine squadron out of
Australia tomorrow." Do you endorse that
assessment?
>> Well, it's certainly a very welcome
assessment, and I can't do anything
except take him on his word except note
that that is not the consensus of
opinion amongst defense and strategic
experts in Australia. There are many who
are concerned that we are not on track
to meet the milestones because it is a
very ambitious infrastructure build in
order to have its full capabilities
available. So, it's possible that a US
submarine could visit now, but to get
all of the sustainment and maintenance
that we hope ultimately to provide to
the US Navy, I think will take some more
time.
>> Why would Admiral Paparo say that it's,
you know, in good enough state to send a
quad a squadron there, but he
anticipates it will be ready next year.
It's incredibly important to him. Why
would he say that if it's as behind as
you suggest it is? And Angus Taylor also
who today said the base is all talk and
not enough investment.
>> Well, Indopaccom is very bullish on uh
Orcus and very bullish on the alliance
with Australia. They are some of our
best friends and strongest advocates in
the US system and I'm glad they are
positive and leaning in and want to do
more with the United States and I would
never discourage them for doing so. I
think it's in our national interest. But
I think as Australians we can also admit
that we've got hurdles to meet. We've
got work to do and I don't get the sense
of urgency nor do I see the sufficient
investment on at a sufficient pace in
order to meet all those hurdles.
>> I want to talk about the reporting
that's come out of the uh UK
parliamentary inquiry into their
involvement in August. The language they
used is deeply concerning uh about
delays in the investment pipeline. Now
you're talking about uh planning for
contingencies now. Is that because you
think that we are not going to meet
those milestones and we need to make
decisions now for acquisitions that will
fill gaps created by Orcus next decade?
>> What we've heard from the UK Parliament
is sobering, but it's consistent from
what we've heard from congressional
analysts in the United States as well,
which is that Orcus is achievable, but
not on status quo policies, not without
increased investment and focus and
momentum. And so I want to both double
down on August to make sure it is
delivered hopefully on time and on
schedule, but also prepare for
contingencies for any possible
capability gaps that might emerge. You
know, right now as a country, we are
trying to engage in a life of type
extension for our Collins class
submarines, which in simple terms
involves cutting it open, upgrading the
components, and putting it back together
again. And that's a high-risk activity
which could involve slippage. And I
don't want any capability gaps to open
up particularly in the late 2020s or
early 2030s at exactly the moment of the
greatest peril according to most defense
analysts. So I do think we have to start
thinking about possible contingencies of
complimentary capabilities that can help
fill any of those gaps should they
emerge.
>> And what would that what would that
capability look like? You're talking
about stealth bombers.
>> Yeah. What one idea I put on the table
today which I've encouraged the
government to have a second look at is
the B-21 uh stealth bomber. It is a
longrange stealth strike capability
which is one of the functions that a
nuclearpropelled submarine would perform
and it has the advantage of hopefully
deterring any economic coercion or
military coercion on Australia's supply
chains particularly at the strategic
choke points the maritime choke points
to our north and northwest. Uh that's
the kind of capability that could be an
addition to a nuclear submarine
capability but also supplement it before
it arrives.
>> James Patterson, thank you very much
indeed for joining us. Thanks Sarah.
>> Thank you.