[00:00] Shadow Defense Minister James Patterson
[00:02] said today the government should be much
[00:04] more blunt about the military threats
[00:06] facing Australia and that if we really
[00:08] knew how serious those threats were, we
[00:10] would be demonstrating in the streets
[00:12] for more spending on our defense. Orca
[00:15] submarines are part of that debate
[00:16] following reports from the UK of delays,
[00:18] potential delays in production. James
[00:21] Patterson joins me now. James Patterson,
[00:22] welcome.
[00:23] >> Thank you for having me.
[00:24] >> First of all, is One Nation going to run
[00:26] over the Liberal candidate in Farah? The
[00:28] farab election is going to be very
[00:30] challenging for the liberal and national
[00:31] parties. We know we are not at an
[00:33] electoral high point nationally and we
[00:35] know that One Nation's appeal at the
[00:37] moment appears to be especially
[00:38] concentrated in regional and rural
[00:40] electorates. But we have an outstanding
[00:43] Liberal candidate, an outstanding
[00:44] national candidate. And if people do
[00:46] want to see change in this country, the
[00:48] best way to do that is to vote for a
[00:49] Liberal or national who can actually
[00:51] change the government, not a party of
[00:53] protest that can't deliver anything for
[00:55] an electorate like Farah or indeed the
[00:57] country. Let's talk James Patterson
[00:59] about your speech that you gave today.
[01:01] It's essentially, as I said before,
[01:02] about truthtelling in defense. As I
[01:06] referenced there, you say if the if the
[01:07] Australian public knew how likely
[01:09] conflict is in our region and how
[01:12] illprepared we were for it, they would
[01:13] be marching demanding higher defense
[01:15] spending. So, first of all, how likely
[01:18] is it this conflict?
[01:20] I also said it was important not to be
[01:22] inflammatory or irresponsible and so I
[01:24] don't want to do anything which alarms
[01:25] Australians and I particularly don't
[01:27] want to do anything that singles out any
[01:28] diaspora communities or fakes makes them
[01:30] feel uncomfortable. So I want to be
[01:32] measured but also direct. There's not a
[01:34] percentage that I can put on the
[01:35] likelihood of conflict except that it is
[01:37] higher than probably most Australians
[01:39] think. Uh we have the context here. The
[01:42] People's Republic of China is engaged in
[01:44] the largest peacetime buildup of
[01:46] military capability since World War II.
[01:49] And accompanied with that buildup of
[01:51] capability is menacing military drills
[01:54] around Taiwan and rhetoric from Xi
[01:56] Jinping and other Communist Party
[01:58] leaders which say reunification with
[02:01] Taiwan is a core objective of the
[02:03] Communist Party and they are willing to
[02:06] use force if necessary. Now, I don't
[02:08] believe that Xiinping has made a
[02:09] decision to use force, but it is our
[02:11] national interest to discourage and
[02:13] deter him from doing that along with
[02:15] like-minded partners.
[02:16] >> If cander is what you're looking for,
[02:18] then shouldn't you tell us given those
[02:21] circumstances, the context that you
[02:23] describe, exactly what the coalition
[02:25] would spend to defend Australia
[02:27] particularly and on what capabilities?
[02:30] Mhm. [snorts] I should provide as much
[02:32] information as I can responsibly from
[02:34] opposition, but I also shouldn't be
[02:36] cavalier about making commitments
[02:38] without expert advice. So, what I've
[02:40] said is that the best informed
[02:42] Australians like Sarangis Houston and
[02:44] Professor Peter Dean, two of the
[02:46] reviewers for the Albanesei government's
[02:47] defense strategic review, have both
[02:49] since said we need to be spending 3% of
[02:52] GDP on defense. And the coalition is
[02:54] committed to achieving that. The Albani
[02:57] government has now shifted the
[02:58] goalposts. They're now using a different
[03:00] measure which includes things like
[03:01] military pensions which we never used
[03:03] before. But that accounting trick isn't
[03:06] a real increase in investment in defense
[03:08] capability which is what we need. So we
[03:10] say we need 3% of GDP in real terms not
[03:13] in pretend accounting.
[03:14] >> There's been a shift in the terms used
[03:16] by the US military about China. Um well
[03:21] maybe it's a a shift rather in the
[03:23] analysis over over over recent years.
[03:25] This is this is how the uh commander of
[03:28] US Indo Indo the IndoPacific Command put
[03:31] it recently to the US Senate. China has
[03:33] ambitions toward a global military that
[03:36] will project power beyond its near
[03:38] geography to set the rules for every
[03:42] relationship across the globe. Is that
[03:44] what you see?
[03:46] >> I think it's very hard to disagree with
[03:48] that analysis. Obviously, the Chinese
[03:51] government's primary national security
[03:53] interest is its own homeland, and it's
[03:55] near abroad, including Taiwan. But it
[03:58] also clearly is building a military
[03:59] which is capable of projecting power far
[04:01] beyond that. By tonnage and the number
[04:03] of ships, it now has the largest navy in
[04:06] the world. And I think history tells us
[04:08] that it's very rare for great powers to
[04:10] acquire such significant military
[04:12] capability and then never use it. Now, I
[04:14] hope that they don't use it. And we can
[04:16] help make sure that happens by working
[04:18] with other like-minded partners, Japan,
[04:20] the United States, the Philippines, and
[04:21] others who have a shared interest in the
[04:23] stability and peace of the Indopacific.
[04:25] But we need to be doing more than we are
[04:27] now if that is what we want.
[04:29] >> How much is current US behavior
[04:33] impacting public support for the
[04:35] alliance right now?
[04:37] I think it's inarguable that an
[04:39] unconventionable US administration in
[04:41] the second Trump administration has
[04:44] reduced Australian public support uh for
[04:46] the alliance as expressed in opinion
[04:48] polls and that's consistent across the
[04:49] western world. It's particularly evident
[04:51] in Europe. I don't think that actually
[04:53] changes the fundamentals of the US
[04:54] Australia alliance. It's still
[04:56] incredibly robust at other levels. But I
[04:58] think we should be adult and be honest
[05:00] and acknowledge that that has had an
[05:02] impact on how Australians view the
[05:03] United States. and I hear them and
[05:05] understand why they have that concern.
[05:07] It doesn't mean though that Australia's
[05:08] national interest has changed even if
[05:10] Australians disapprove of this
[05:11] administration.
[05:12] >> I understand that. But is it realistic
[05:14] at the same time to tell Australians
[05:16] that the alliance is essentially
[05:18] unchanged when what you're saying is
[05:20] there is less trust in its
[05:22] commanderin-chief?
[05:24] >> Well, I think the alliance is about more
[05:25] than just the personalities of any one
[05:27] commander-in-chief. But it's also
[05:30] about that.
[05:32] >> Yes. And I acknowledge that and I'm not
[05:33] trying to argue with you on that Sarah.
[05:34] Of course, that's a relevant
[05:36] consideration. But the US system is a
[05:38] deep system. It includes its defense
[05:40] establishment, its intelligence
[05:42] establishment, its Congress. It's a
[05:43] co-equal branch of government. And in
[05:46] each of those branches of the
[05:47] government, support for the Australia
[05:49] alliance is fundamental because frankly
[05:51] it's in America's national interest.
[05:52] What Australia offers the United States,
[05:54] it cannot get from elsewhere. things
[05:56] like HMA Sterling which is the submarine
[05:59] rotational base that will be established
[06:00] in the next couple of years for US
[06:02] nuclear submarines to visit. Things like
[06:04] Pine Gap and other intelligence
[06:06] facilities which are a critical part of
[06:08] the Five Eyes Alliance. Those are things
[06:09] which the United States gets from
[06:11] Australia which it can't get elsewhere.
[06:13] And in turn there are things that we get
[06:15] and continue to seek from the United
[06:17] States which we can't get from elsewhere
[06:19] including the Orcus partnership.
[06:20] >> Let let's talk about um HMA Sterling the
[06:23] military base in WA. The same Admiral
[06:26] Paparro said about it recently. In fact,
[06:28] in the same testimony, he said, uh, it's
[06:30] on track for the US forces that will
[06:32] arrive there in WA next year. He said,
[06:35] "We could be ready to operate a
[06:37] rotational submarine squadron out of
[06:39] Australia tomorrow." Do you endorse that
[06:42] assessment?
[06:43] >> Well, it's certainly a very welcome
[06:44] assessment, and I can't do anything
[06:47] except take him on his word except note
[06:49] that that is not the consensus of
[06:50] opinion amongst defense and strategic
[06:52] experts in Australia. There are many who
[06:54] are concerned that we are not on track
[06:56] to meet the milestones because it is a
[06:58] very ambitious infrastructure build in
[07:01] order to have its full capabilities
[07:02] available. So, it's possible that a US
[07:04] submarine could visit now, but to get
[07:06] all of the sustainment and maintenance
[07:08] that we hope ultimately to provide to
[07:10] the US Navy, I think will take some more
[07:11] time.
[07:12] >> Why would Admiral Paparo say that it's,
[07:14] you know, in good enough state to send a
[07:16] quad a squadron there, but he
[07:17] anticipates it will be ready next year.
[07:19] It's incredibly important to him. Why
[07:21] would he say that if it's as behind as
[07:23] you suggest it is? And Angus Taylor also
[07:25] who today said the base is all talk and
[07:27] not enough investment.
[07:29] >> Well, Indopaccom is very bullish on uh
[07:32] Orcus and very bullish on the alliance
[07:34] with Australia. They are some of our
[07:35] best friends and strongest advocates in
[07:37] the US system and I'm glad they are
[07:39] positive and leaning in and want to do
[07:41] more with the United States and I would
[07:43] never discourage them for doing so. I
[07:44] think it's in our national interest. But
[07:46] I think as Australians we can also admit
[07:47] that we've got hurdles to meet. We've
[07:49] got work to do and I don't get the sense
[07:52] of urgency nor do I see the sufficient
[07:55] investment on at a sufficient pace in
[07:57] order to meet all those hurdles.
[07:59] >> I want to talk about the reporting
[08:00] that's come out of the uh UK
[08:02] parliamentary inquiry into their
[08:05] involvement in August. The language they
[08:07] used is deeply concerning uh about
[08:10] delays in the investment pipeline. Now
[08:13] you're talking about uh planning for
[08:16] contingencies now. Is that because you
[08:19] think that we are not going to meet
[08:21] those milestones and we need to make
[08:22] decisions now for acquisitions that will
[08:25] fill gaps created by Orcus next decade?
[08:29] >> What we've heard from the UK Parliament
[08:31] is sobering, but it's consistent from
[08:32] what we've heard from congressional
[08:34] analysts in the United States as well,
[08:36] which is that Orcus is achievable, but
[08:38] not on status quo policies, not without
[08:40] increased investment and focus and
[08:42] momentum. And so I want to both double
[08:45] down on August to make sure it is
[08:46] delivered hopefully on time and on
[08:48] schedule, but also prepare for
[08:50] contingencies for any possible
[08:52] capability gaps that might emerge. You
[08:54] know, right now as a country, we are
[08:55] trying to engage in a life of type
[08:57] extension for our Collins class
[08:58] submarines, which in simple terms
[09:00] involves cutting it open, upgrading the
[09:03] components, and putting it back together
[09:04] again. And that's a high-risk activity
[09:07] which could involve slippage. And I
[09:08] don't want any capability gaps to open
[09:10] up particularly in the late 2020s or
[09:13] early 2030s at exactly the moment of the
[09:16] greatest peril according to most defense
[09:18] analysts. So I do think we have to start
[09:20] thinking about possible contingencies of
[09:22] complimentary capabilities that can help
[09:24] fill any of those gaps should they
[09:26] emerge.
[09:26] >> And what would that what would that
[09:28] capability look like? You're talking
[09:29] about stealth bombers.
[09:31] >> Yeah. What one idea I put on the table
[09:32] today which I've encouraged the
[09:33] government to have a second look at is
[09:35] the B-21 uh stealth bomber. It is a
[09:38] longrange stealth strike capability
[09:40] which is one of the functions that a
[09:42] nuclearpropelled submarine would perform
[09:44] and it has the advantage of hopefully
[09:46] deterring any economic coercion or
[09:48] military coercion on Australia's supply
[09:50] chains particularly at the strategic
[09:53] choke points the maritime choke points
[09:55] to our north and northwest. Uh that's
[09:57] the kind of capability that could be an
[09:59] addition to a nuclear submarine
[10:01] capability but also supplement it before
[10:03] it arrives.
[10:04] >> James Patterson, thank you very much
[10:05] indeed for joining us. Thanks Sarah.
[10:07] >> Thank you.