1 00:00:00,560 --> 00:00:04,400 Shadow Defense Minister James Patterson 2 00:00:02,560 --> 00:00:06,480 said today the government should be much 3 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:08,800 more blunt about the military threats 4 00:00:06,480 --> 00:00:10,960 facing Australia and that if we really 5 00:00:08,800 --> 00:00:12,480 knew how serious those threats were, we 6 00:00:10,960 --> 00:00:15,040 would be demonstrating in the streets 7 00:00:12,480 --> 00:00:16,640 for more spending on our defense. Orca 8 00:00:15,039 --> 00:00:18,960 submarines are part of that debate 9 00:00:16,640 --> 00:00:21,039 following reports from the UK of delays, 10 00:00:18,960 --> 00:00:22,640 potential delays in production. James 11 00:00:21,039 --> 00:00:23,600 Patterson joins me now. James Patterson, 12 00:00:22,640 --> 00:00:24,560 welcome. 13 00:00:23,600 --> 00:00:26,080 >> Thank you for having me. 14 00:00:24,559 --> 00:00:28,719 >> First of all, is One Nation going to run 15 00:00:26,079 --> 00:00:30,159 over the Liberal candidate in Farah? The 16 00:00:28,719 --> 00:00:31,759 farab election is going to be very 17 00:00:30,160 --> 00:00:33,600 challenging for the liberal and national 18 00:00:31,760 --> 00:00:35,359 parties. We know we are not at an 19 00:00:33,600 --> 00:00:37,120 electoral high point nationally and we 20 00:00:35,359 --> 00:00:38,799 know that One Nation's appeal at the 21 00:00:37,119 --> 00:00:40,959 moment appears to be especially 22 00:00:38,799 --> 00:00:43,039 concentrated in regional and rural 23 00:00:40,960 --> 00:00:44,480 electorates. But we have an outstanding 24 00:00:43,039 --> 00:00:46,640 Liberal candidate, an outstanding 25 00:00:44,479 --> 00:00:48,159 national candidate. And if people do 26 00:00:46,640 --> 00:00:49,920 want to see change in this country, the 27 00:00:48,159 --> 00:00:51,439 best way to do that is to vote for a 28 00:00:49,920 --> 00:00:53,198 Liberal or national who can actually 29 00:00:51,439 --> 00:00:55,280 change the government, not a party of 30 00:00:53,198 --> 00:00:57,119 protest that can't deliver anything for 31 00:00:55,280 --> 00:00:59,120 an electorate like Farah or indeed the 32 00:00:57,119 --> 00:01:01,358 country. Let's talk James Patterson 33 00:00:59,119 --> 00:01:02,878 about your speech that you gave today. 34 00:01:01,359 --> 00:01:06,000 It's essentially, as I said before, 35 00:01:02,878 --> 00:01:07,759 about truthtelling in defense. As I 36 00:01:06,000 --> 00:01:09,438 referenced there, you say if the if the 37 00:01:07,760 --> 00:01:12,000 Australian public knew how likely 38 00:01:09,438 --> 00:01:13,759 conflict is in our region and how 39 00:01:12,000 --> 00:01:15,840 illprepared we were for it, they would 40 00:01:13,760 --> 00:01:18,159 be marching demanding higher defense 41 00:01:15,840 --> 00:01:20,400 spending. So, first of all, how likely 42 00:01:18,159 --> 00:01:22,240 is it this conflict? 43 00:01:20,400 --> 00:01:24,320 I also said it was important not to be 44 00:01:22,239 --> 00:01:25,759 inflammatory or irresponsible and so I 45 00:01:24,319 --> 00:01:27,279 don't want to do anything which alarms 46 00:01:25,759 --> 00:01:28,799 Australians and I particularly don't 47 00:01:27,280 --> 00:01:30,640 want to do anything that singles out any 48 00:01:28,799 --> 00:01:32,159 diaspora communities or fakes makes them 49 00:01:30,640 --> 00:01:34,478 feel uncomfortable. So I want to be 50 00:01:32,159 --> 00:01:35,759 measured but also direct. There's not a 51 00:01:34,478 --> 00:01:37,679 percentage that I can put on the 52 00:01:35,759 --> 00:01:39,439 likelihood of conflict except that it is 53 00:01:37,680 --> 00:01:42,000 higher than probably most Australians 54 00:01:39,438 --> 00:01:44,078 think. Uh we have the context here. The 55 00:01:42,000 --> 00:01:46,879 People's Republic of China is engaged in 56 00:01:44,078 --> 00:01:49,519 the largest peacetime buildup of 57 00:01:46,879 --> 00:01:51,199 military capability since World War II. 58 00:01:49,519 --> 00:01:54,158 And accompanied with that buildup of 59 00:01:51,200 --> 00:01:56,960 capability is menacing military drills 60 00:01:54,159 --> 00:01:58,799 around Taiwan and rhetoric from Xi 61 00:01:56,959 --> 00:02:01,919 Jinping and other Communist Party 62 00:01:58,799 --> 00:02:03,600 leaders which say reunification with 63 00:02:01,920 --> 00:02:06,240 Taiwan is a core objective of the 64 00:02:03,599 --> 00:02:08,239 Communist Party and they are willing to 65 00:02:06,239 --> 00:02:09,598 use force if necessary. Now, I don't 66 00:02:08,239 --> 00:02:11,599 believe that Xiinping has made a 67 00:02:09,598 --> 00:02:13,519 decision to use force, but it is our 68 00:02:11,598 --> 00:02:15,199 national interest to discourage and 69 00:02:13,520 --> 00:02:16,480 deter him from doing that along with 70 00:02:15,199 --> 00:02:18,878 like-minded partners. 71 00:02:16,479 --> 00:02:21,359 >> If cander is what you're looking for, 72 00:02:18,878 --> 00:02:23,199 then shouldn't you tell us given those 73 00:02:21,360 --> 00:02:25,120 circumstances, the context that you 74 00:02:23,199 --> 00:02:27,519 describe, exactly what the coalition 75 00:02:25,120 --> 00:02:30,239 would spend to defend Australia 76 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:32,400 particularly and on what capabilities? 77 00:02:30,239 --> 00:02:34,400 Mhm. [snorts] I should provide as much 78 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:36,560 information as I can responsibly from 79 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:38,400 opposition, but I also shouldn't be 80 00:02:36,560 --> 00:02:40,719 cavalier about making commitments 81 00:02:38,400 --> 00:02:42,400 without expert advice. So, what I've 82 00:02:40,719 --> 00:02:44,318 said is that the best informed 83 00:02:42,400 --> 00:02:46,159 Australians like Sarangis Houston and 84 00:02:44,318 --> 00:02:47,919 Professor Peter Dean, two of the 85 00:02:46,159 --> 00:02:49,840 reviewers for the Albanesei government's 86 00:02:47,919 --> 00:02:52,159 defense strategic review, have both 87 00:02:49,840 --> 00:02:54,959 since said we need to be spending 3% of 88 00:02:52,159 --> 00:02:57,199 GDP on defense. And the coalition is 89 00:02:54,959 --> 00:02:58,239 committed to achieving that. The Albani 90 00:02:57,199 --> 00:03:00,399 government has now shifted the 91 00:02:58,239 --> 00:03:01,920 goalposts. They're now using a different 92 00:03:00,400 --> 00:03:03,519 measure which includes things like 93 00:03:01,919 --> 00:03:06,079 military pensions which we never used 94 00:03:03,519 --> 00:03:08,400 before. But that accounting trick isn't 95 00:03:06,080 --> 00:03:10,159 a real increase in investment in defense 96 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:13,200 capability which is what we need. So we 97 00:03:10,158 --> 00:03:14,719 say we need 3% of GDP in real terms not 98 00:03:13,199 --> 00:03:16,878 in pretend accounting. 99 00:03:14,719 --> 00:03:21,280 >> There's been a shift in the terms used 100 00:03:16,878 --> 00:03:23,280 by the US military about China. Um well 101 00:03:21,280 --> 00:03:25,919 maybe it's a a shift rather in the 102 00:03:23,280 --> 00:03:28,400 analysis over over over recent years. 103 00:03:25,919 --> 00:03:31,199 This is this is how the uh commander of 104 00:03:28,400 --> 00:03:33,680 US Indo Indo the IndoPacific Command put 105 00:03:31,199 --> 00:03:36,719 it recently to the US Senate. China has 106 00:03:33,680 --> 00:03:38,879 ambitions toward a global military that 107 00:03:36,719 --> 00:03:42,318 will project power beyond its near 108 00:03:38,878 --> 00:03:44,878 geography to set the rules for every 109 00:03:42,318 --> 00:03:46,399 relationship across the globe. Is that 110 00:03:44,878 --> 00:03:48,399 what you see? 111 00:03:46,400 --> 00:03:51,039 >> I think it's very hard to disagree with 112 00:03:48,400 --> 00:03:53,039 that analysis. Obviously, the Chinese 113 00:03:51,039 --> 00:03:55,359 government's primary national security 114 00:03:53,039 --> 00:03:58,000 interest is its own homeland, and it's 115 00:03:55,360 --> 00:03:59,599 near abroad, including Taiwan. But it 116 00:03:58,000 --> 00:04:01,598 also clearly is building a military 117 00:03:59,598 --> 00:04:03,518 which is capable of projecting power far 118 00:04:01,598 --> 00:04:06,000 beyond that. By tonnage and the number 119 00:04:03,519 --> 00:04:08,319 of ships, it now has the largest navy in 120 00:04:06,000 --> 00:04:10,318 the world. And I think history tells us 121 00:04:08,318 --> 00:04:12,079 that it's very rare for great powers to 122 00:04:10,318 --> 00:04:14,399 acquire such significant military 123 00:04:12,080 --> 00:04:16,639 capability and then never use it. Now, I 124 00:04:14,400 --> 00:04:18,160 hope that they don't use it. And we can 125 00:04:16,639 --> 00:04:20,000 help make sure that happens by working 126 00:04:18,160 --> 00:04:21,600 with other like-minded partners, Japan, 127 00:04:20,000 --> 00:04:23,360 the United States, the Philippines, and 128 00:04:21,600 --> 00:04:25,520 others who have a shared interest in the 129 00:04:23,360 --> 00:04:27,520 stability and peace of the Indopacific. 130 00:04:25,519 --> 00:04:29,439 But we need to be doing more than we are 131 00:04:27,519 --> 00:04:33,039 now if that is what we want. 132 00:04:29,439 --> 00:04:35,680 >> How much is current US behavior 133 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:37,680 impacting public support for the 134 00:04:35,680 --> 00:04:39,840 alliance right now? 135 00:04:37,680 --> 00:04:41,918 I think it's inarguable that an 136 00:04:39,839 --> 00:04:44,079 unconventionable US administration in 137 00:04:41,918 --> 00:04:46,399 the second Trump administration has 138 00:04:44,079 --> 00:04:48,000 reduced Australian public support uh for 139 00:04:46,399 --> 00:04:49,758 the alliance as expressed in opinion 140 00:04:48,000 --> 00:04:51,279 polls and that's consistent across the 141 00:04:49,759 --> 00:04:53,120 western world. It's particularly evident 142 00:04:51,279 --> 00:04:54,879 in Europe. I don't think that actually 143 00:04:53,120 --> 00:04:56,079 changes the fundamentals of the US 144 00:04:54,879 --> 00:04:58,560 Australia alliance. It's still 145 00:04:56,079 --> 00:05:00,560 incredibly robust at other levels. But I 146 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:02,319 think we should be adult and be honest 147 00:05:00,560 --> 00:05:03,839 and acknowledge that that has had an 148 00:05:02,319 --> 00:05:05,680 impact on how Australians view the 149 00:05:03,839 --> 00:05:07,439 United States. and I hear them and 150 00:05:05,680 --> 00:05:08,959 understand why they have that concern. 151 00:05:07,439 --> 00:05:10,560 It doesn't mean though that Australia's 152 00:05:08,959 --> 00:05:11,918 national interest has changed even if 153 00:05:10,560 --> 00:05:12,720 Australians disapprove of this 154 00:05:11,918 --> 00:05:14,478 administration. 155 00:05:12,720 --> 00:05:16,400 >> I understand that. But is it realistic 156 00:05:14,478 --> 00:05:18,159 at the same time to tell Australians 157 00:05:16,399 --> 00:05:20,000 that the alliance is essentially 158 00:05:18,160 --> 00:05:22,240 unchanged when what you're saying is 159 00:05:20,000 --> 00:05:24,478 there is less trust in its 160 00:05:22,240 --> 00:05:25,918 commanderin-chief? 161 00:05:24,478 --> 00:05:27,758 >> Well, I think the alliance is about more 162 00:05:25,918 --> 00:05:30,959 than just the personalities of any one 163 00:05:27,759 --> 00:05:32,000 commander-in-chief. But it's also 164 00:05:30,959 --> 00:05:33,519 about that. 165 00:05:32,000 --> 00:05:34,959 >> Yes. And I acknowledge that and I'm not 166 00:05:33,519 --> 00:05:36,000 trying to argue with you on that Sarah. 167 00:05:34,959 --> 00:05:38,319 Of course, that's a relevant 168 00:05:36,000 --> 00:05:40,879 consideration. But the US system is a 169 00:05:38,319 --> 00:05:42,159 deep system. It includes its defense 170 00:05:40,879 --> 00:05:43,680 establishment, its intelligence 171 00:05:42,160 --> 00:05:46,080 establishment, its Congress. It's a 172 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:47,600 co-equal branch of government. And in 173 00:05:46,079 --> 00:05:49,038 each of those branches of the 174 00:05:47,600 --> 00:05:51,280 government, support for the Australia 175 00:05:49,038 --> 00:05:52,639 alliance is fundamental because frankly 176 00:05:51,279 --> 00:05:54,638 it's in America's national interest. 177 00:05:52,639 --> 00:05:56,879 What Australia offers the United States, 178 00:05:54,639 --> 00:05:59,120 it cannot get from elsewhere. things 179 00:05:56,879 --> 00:06:00,959 like HMA Sterling which is the submarine 180 00:05:59,120 --> 00:06:02,560 rotational base that will be established 181 00:06:00,959 --> 00:06:04,879 in the next couple of years for US 182 00:06:02,560 --> 00:06:06,319 nuclear submarines to visit. Things like 183 00:06:04,879 --> 00:06:08,000 Pine Gap and other intelligence 184 00:06:06,319 --> 00:06:09,919 facilities which are a critical part of 185 00:06:08,000 --> 00:06:11,279 the Five Eyes Alliance. Those are things 186 00:06:09,918 --> 00:06:13,120 which the United States gets from 187 00:06:11,279 --> 00:06:15,279 Australia which it can't get elsewhere. 188 00:06:13,120 --> 00:06:17,120 And in turn there are things that we get 189 00:06:15,279 --> 00:06:19,279 and continue to seek from the United 190 00:06:17,120 --> 00:06:20,800 States which we can't get from elsewhere 191 00:06:19,279 --> 00:06:23,279 including the Orcus partnership. 192 00:06:20,800 --> 00:06:26,000 >> Let let's talk about um HMA Sterling the 193 00:06:23,279 --> 00:06:28,318 military base in WA. The same Admiral 194 00:06:26,000 --> 00:06:30,879 Paparro said about it recently. In fact, 195 00:06:28,319 --> 00:06:32,960 in the same testimony, he said, uh, it's 196 00:06:30,879 --> 00:06:35,519 on track for the US forces that will 197 00:06:32,959 --> 00:06:37,439 arrive there in WA next year. He said, 198 00:06:35,519 --> 00:06:39,839 "We could be ready to operate a 199 00:06:37,439 --> 00:06:42,319 rotational submarine squadron out of 200 00:06:39,839 --> 00:06:43,439 Australia tomorrow." Do you endorse that 201 00:06:42,319 --> 00:06:44,960 assessment? 202 00:06:43,439 --> 00:06:47,120 >> Well, it's certainly a very welcome 203 00:06:44,959 --> 00:06:49,198 assessment, and I can't do anything 204 00:06:47,120 --> 00:06:50,879 except take him on his word except note 205 00:06:49,199 --> 00:06:52,720 that that is not the consensus of 206 00:06:50,879 --> 00:06:54,560 opinion amongst defense and strategic 207 00:06:52,720 --> 00:06:56,720 experts in Australia. There are many who 208 00:06:54,560 --> 00:06:58,720 are concerned that we are not on track 209 00:06:56,720 --> 00:07:01,199 to meet the milestones because it is a 210 00:06:58,720 --> 00:07:02,880 very ambitious infrastructure build in 211 00:07:01,199 --> 00:07:04,720 order to have its full capabilities 212 00:07:02,879 --> 00:07:06,800 available. So, it's possible that a US 213 00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:08,400 submarine could visit now, but to get 214 00:07:06,800 --> 00:07:10,079 all of the sustainment and maintenance 215 00:07:08,399 --> 00:07:11,758 that we hope ultimately to provide to 216 00:07:10,079 --> 00:07:12,159 the US Navy, I think will take some more 217 00:07:11,759 --> 00:07:14,400 time. 218 00:07:12,160 --> 00:07:16,400 >> Why would Admiral Paparo say that it's, 219 00:07:14,399 --> 00:07:17,679 you know, in good enough state to send a 220 00:07:16,399 --> 00:07:19,679 quad a squadron there, but he 221 00:07:17,680 --> 00:07:21,759 anticipates it will be ready next year. 222 00:07:19,680 --> 00:07:23,598 It's incredibly important to him. Why 223 00:07:21,759 --> 00:07:25,680 would he say that if it's as behind as 224 00:07:23,598 --> 00:07:27,839 you suggest it is? And Angus Taylor also 225 00:07:25,680 --> 00:07:29,598 who today said the base is all talk and 226 00:07:27,839 --> 00:07:32,399 not enough investment. 227 00:07:29,598 --> 00:07:34,399 >> Well, Indopaccom is very bullish on uh 228 00:07:32,399 --> 00:07:35,679 Orcus and very bullish on the alliance 229 00:07:34,399 --> 00:07:37,598 with Australia. They are some of our 230 00:07:35,680 --> 00:07:39,680 best friends and strongest advocates in 231 00:07:37,598 --> 00:07:41,598 the US system and I'm glad they are 232 00:07:39,680 --> 00:07:43,120 positive and leaning in and want to do 233 00:07:41,598 --> 00:07:44,800 more with the United States and I would 234 00:07:43,120 --> 00:07:46,319 never discourage them for doing so. I 235 00:07:44,800 --> 00:07:47,919 think it's in our national interest. But 236 00:07:46,319 --> 00:07:49,840 I think as Australians we can also admit 237 00:07:47,918 --> 00:07:52,318 that we've got hurdles to meet. We've 238 00:07:49,839 --> 00:07:55,198 got work to do and I don't get the sense 239 00:07:52,319 --> 00:07:57,759 of urgency nor do I see the sufficient 240 00:07:55,199 --> 00:07:59,199 investment on at a sufficient pace in 241 00:07:57,759 --> 00:08:00,639 order to meet all those hurdles. 242 00:07:59,199 --> 00:08:02,800 >> I want to talk about the reporting 243 00:08:00,639 --> 00:08:05,360 that's come out of the uh UK 244 00:08:02,800 --> 00:08:07,598 parliamentary inquiry into their 245 00:08:05,360 --> 00:08:10,400 involvement in August. The language they 246 00:08:07,598 --> 00:08:13,439 used is deeply concerning uh about 247 00:08:10,399 --> 00:08:16,638 delays in the investment pipeline. Now 248 00:08:13,439 --> 00:08:19,038 you're talking about uh planning for 249 00:08:16,639 --> 00:08:21,120 contingencies now. Is that because you 250 00:08:19,038 --> 00:08:22,639 think that we are not going to meet 251 00:08:21,120 --> 00:08:25,439 those milestones and we need to make 252 00:08:22,639 --> 00:08:29,598 decisions now for acquisitions that will 253 00:08:25,439 --> 00:08:31,120 fill gaps created by Orcus next decade? 254 00:08:29,598 --> 00:08:32,879 >> What we've heard from the UK Parliament 255 00:08:31,120 --> 00:08:34,479 is sobering, but it's consistent from 256 00:08:32,879 --> 00:08:36,240 what we've heard from congressional 257 00:08:34,479 --> 00:08:38,320 analysts in the United States as well, 258 00:08:36,240 --> 00:08:40,320 which is that Orcus is achievable, but 259 00:08:38,320 --> 00:08:42,320 not on status quo policies, not without 260 00:08:40,320 --> 00:08:45,040 increased investment and focus and 261 00:08:42,320 --> 00:08:46,640 momentum. And so I want to both double 262 00:08:45,039 --> 00:08:48,319 down on August to make sure it is 263 00:08:46,639 --> 00:08:50,159 delivered hopefully on time and on 264 00:08:48,320 --> 00:08:52,080 schedule, but also prepare for 265 00:08:50,159 --> 00:08:54,000 contingencies for any possible 266 00:08:52,080 --> 00:08:55,360 capability gaps that might emerge. You 267 00:08:54,000 --> 00:08:57,120 know, right now as a country, we are 268 00:08:55,360 --> 00:08:58,720 trying to engage in a life of type 269 00:08:57,120 --> 00:09:00,720 extension for our Collins class 270 00:08:58,720 --> 00:09:03,040 submarines, which in simple terms 271 00:09:00,720 --> 00:09:04,639 involves cutting it open, upgrading the 272 00:09:03,039 --> 00:09:07,120 components, and putting it back together 273 00:09:04,639 --> 00:09:08,799 again. And that's a high-risk activity 274 00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:10,720 which could involve slippage. And I 275 00:09:08,799 --> 00:09:13,120 don't want any capability gaps to open 276 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:16,320 up particularly in the late 2020s or 277 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:18,320 early 2030s at exactly the moment of the 278 00:09:16,320 --> 00:09:20,240 greatest peril according to most defense 279 00:09:18,320 --> 00:09:22,720 analysts. So I do think we have to start 280 00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:24,799 thinking about possible contingencies of 281 00:09:22,720 --> 00:09:26,399 complimentary capabilities that can help 282 00:09:24,799 --> 00:09:26,799 fill any of those gaps should they 283 00:09:26,399 --> 00:09:28,080 emerge. 284 00:09:26,799 --> 00:09:29,679 >> And what would that what would that 285 00:09:28,080 --> 00:09:31,040 capability look like? You're talking 286 00:09:29,679 --> 00:09:32,639 about stealth bombers. 287 00:09:31,039 --> 00:09:33,919 >> Yeah. What one idea I put on the table 288 00:09:32,639 --> 00:09:35,679 today which I've encouraged the 289 00:09:33,919 --> 00:09:38,479 government to have a second look at is 290 00:09:35,679 --> 00:09:40,479 the B-21 uh stealth bomber. It is a 291 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:42,080 longrange stealth strike capability 292 00:09:40,480 --> 00:09:44,720 which is one of the functions that a 293 00:09:42,080 --> 00:09:46,399 nuclearpropelled submarine would perform 294 00:09:44,720 --> 00:09:48,959 and it has the advantage of hopefully 295 00:09:46,399 --> 00:09:50,879 deterring any economic coercion or 296 00:09:48,958 --> 00:09:53,359 military coercion on Australia's supply 297 00:09:50,879 --> 00:09:55,439 chains particularly at the strategic 298 00:09:53,360 --> 00:09:57,519 choke points the maritime choke points 299 00:09:55,440 --> 00:09:59,519 to our north and northwest. Uh that's 300 00:09:57,519 --> 00:10:01,278 the kind of capability that could be an 301 00:09:59,519 --> 00:10:03,360 addition to a nuclear submarine 302 00:10:01,278 --> 00:10:04,240 capability but also supplement it before 303 00:10:03,360 --> 00:10:05,440 it arrives. 304 00:10:04,240 --> 00:10:07,759 >> James Patterson, thank you very much 305 00:10:05,440 --> 00:10:10,920 indeed for joining us. Thanks Sarah. 306 00:10:07,759 --> 00:10:10,919 >> Thank you.